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Money laundering (ML) corrupts financial markets, affects the public's confi-
dence ,in the financial system and tends to create an increasingly risky market de-
creasing growth rate. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime evaluates the 
worldwide bank fraud at one trillion dollars dollars per year. Because it costs the 
world economy so much, ML is becoming an important field of interest for govern-
mental entities. Recommendations and directives are taken by international entities. 
These directives have to be interpreted by countries and transformed into national 
laws. Certain financial institutions and individuals are forced to translate these na-
tional laws into measures and procedures according to the nature of the activities of 
these institutions. Given the large amount of data and the complexity of the finan-
cial system, decision-support systems are needed to help experts identify suspicious 
transactions. This need has created a strong competition on the market of AML 
solutions proposing many sophisticated solutions to detect suspicious cases. 
Despite the already taken measures at the governmental and financial domains 
and the developed systems in the technical area, experts highlight that the de-
tection of money laundering is inefficient in financial institutions. Indeed, accord-
ing to interviewed experts,Mrs Anne Golfischer ( compliance officer), Mr Christian 
Tourni(detached expert at the European Commission) and Mr Markus E. Schulz 
( chief compliance officer and supervisor of the ACAMS), measures taken within fi-
nancial institutions to fight against money laundering are enough to respect imposed 
recommendations, directives and laws but are not efficient to really fight against 
money laundering. 
Considering this, this master thesis identifies some of the reasons for the cur-
rent lack of efficiency in the ML detection performed by financial institutions at 
the technical (AML systems), formal (international and national entities) and infor-
ma! level (motivation, implication, attitude of financial institutions toward money 
laundering). This investigation aims to offer some recommendations to improve the 




The fight against money laundering is not a new field of interest. According the 
FATF, the Financial Action Task Force, an inter-governmental body which "has 
developed a series of recommendations that are recognized as the international 
standard for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction" [37] ( see section 3.1), many regulation 
institutions were concerned with developing policies to fight against money launder-
ing and to combat the usage of the financial system for drug traffic. But after 11 th 
September 2001, this field has become more important and more oriented against 
financial terrorism. 
Constrained by regulations and policies, European governments required a con-
crete implication from all financial entities of their country in the suspicious activity 
detection and in the production of Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). In view of the 
large amount of data and the complexity of the financial system, decision-support 
systems helping experts in the identification of suspicious transactions are needed. 
This need has created a strong competition on the market of AML solutions as well 
as a real interest in this field. 
Nowadays, money laundering is becoming an extensively studied tapie and more 
and more publications are available in this field as well in the governmental and 
financial area as in the technical one ([13, 14, 15, 32, 21, 20, 3, 37, 31, 45, 33, 43, 
1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2 
7, 24, 23, 10, 30, 8, 22, 11, 4, 29, 1]). Despite the already taken measures at the 
governmental and financial domains and developed systems at the technical area, a 
lack of efficiency in the detection of money laundering performed by financial insti-
tutions is highlighted by experts in this field met and who were interviewed during 
the writing of this thesis [27, 28]. Indeed, according to these experts, measures taken 
within financial institutions to fight against money laundering are enough to respect 
imposed recommendations, directives and laws but are not efficient to really fight 
against money laundering. This lack of efficiency is related by the United Nations 
Office on Drug and Crime which evaluates the worldwide bank fraud at 1 trillion 
dollars in one year. Considering this dramatic evidence, it appears more and more 
urgent as well for institutions as for nations to implement procedures and mecha-
nisms to prevent and detect this kind of financial fraud which is more and more 
present and sophisticated [20]. 
Money laundering corrupts financial markets, affects the public's confidence in 
the financial system and tends to create a more and more risky market with a rate of 
growth which decreases [4]. Because money laundering costs the world economy so 
much, this master thesis aims to highlight some reasons and sources of the current 
lack of efficiency in the ML detection performed by financial institutions, in the pur-
pose to offer some recommendations to improve the performance of this detection 
and consequently to decrease the cost for the world economy. 
Different hypotheses at the technical, formal and informal level can explain this 
deficiency. 
At the technical level, the lack could corne from the technical measures taken 
by financial institutions to detect suspicious cases. These used AML solutions are 
studied in chapter 2 which aims to identify limits of these systems. Through the 
analysis presented in this chapter some additional qualities required for a more suit-
able and efficient solution are highlighted: (1) adding a learning capability to AML 
system, (2) adding mechanisms which can bring a more accurate detection, and (3) 
the need to have a system which canuse different database format. This chapter also 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3 
describes some techniques and mechanisms to respond to these additional required 
qualities. 
Secondly, at the formal level, this lack can corne from the problems of strictness 
of interpretation of trans-national AML recommendations and directives in national 
laws and of the translation of these national laws into AML procedures and measures 
by financial institutions at the local level. These hypotheses are analyzed in chapter 
3. 
Lastly, this lack of efficiency could also directly corne from the lack of motiva-
tion to and implication in the AML track of financial institutions. The chapter 4 
presents these informal problems and highlights for example the importance that 
financial institutions have a positive attitude towards AML and cultivates a moral 
responsibility in this track, that the AML responsible people well know the banking 
and ML process, and that the AML staff takes time and invest to well understand 
the used AML software to improve its performance. 
In view of these hypotheses concerning the lack of efficiency of the ML detec-
tion within financial institutions as well at the technical, formal and informal level, 
chapter 5 proposes some recommendations to improve the detection performance. 
The contribution of this thesis lies in the span of analysis across the informal, 
formal, and technical domains. Indeed, current researches about money laundering 
are mostly based on one of these three system: the technical articles presenting 
systems don't care about the legislation around money laundering, nor about the 
technical capabilities of AML staff in financial institutions, the legislation don't care 
about methods used by financial institutions to respect it, etc. . Thanks to an anl-
ysis taking into account several interrelated domains a more complete and realistic 
view of the reasons for the lack of efficiency of the ML detection is provided. 
Various topics can be studied in relation to fraud detection but I have focused 
this work on the detection of suspicious activities related to money laundering by 
financial institutions. No other techniques to fight against suspicious activities ( e.g. 
the study of social networks, etc.) are explored .in the present survey. This is not to 
suggest that this topic is not important. But I would like to limit the scope of this 
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thesis to the identification of the sources for the lack of efficiency of the detection 
of suspicious activities by financial institutions. l'm convinced that staying focused 
on this li,mited area could perhaps bring more limited but also more precise results. 
Moreover, financial institutions play a major role in the AML fight. 
Regarding the methodology used to write this essay, I principally took stock of 
the available literature. No analysis based on really implemented AML solutions is 
performed. The reason for this choice is not a lack of interest, but only the secrecy 
about AML solutions. Through some meetings with financial entities and solution 
providers, I could perceive the sensitive side of this area. 
In the rest of this chapter, firstly, the money laundering is defined and situated 
among other financial frauds with the aim to establish the scope of the analysis 
proposed in this thesis. Secondly, the ML process is presented in the purpose to 
highlight the complexity of this one and the number of actors and entities implicated 
in this process. Thirdly, this complexity being increased by the number of tools and 
techniques which can be used by money launderers within this process, the most 
common ones are described. 
1.2 Important Concepts 
Before going on with the research question, let us define the most important used 
concepts. The first ones include the definition of the concept of fraud and the 
position of money laundering among the other kinds of fraud. Next, the concept 
of money laundering (ML) is defined. Moreover, the ML process and the different 
tools and techniques used by money launderers are also exposed. Lastly, the TFI 
framework is presented. This framework is considered as the cornerstone for the 
whole analysis performed in this work. 
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1.2.1 Fraud 
A) Definition 
There is not only one definition of what a financial fraud is [25]. Let us analyze 
some of them. 
• The Oxford English Dictionary [2] defines a financial fraud as " a wrongful 
or criminal deception intended to result in financial or persona[ gain". This 
definition reveals two important characteristics: the criminal character of a 
financial fraud and the goal, a personal gain. 
• A financial fraud is also identified as "a deliberate act that is contrary to 
law, rule or policy with intent to obtain unauthorized financial benefit" [19]. 
Through this definition, a financial fraud is one more time identified as contrary 
to the law and with the aim of financial benefits. Moreover, the " deliberate" 
character of the fraud is highlighted. 
• Finally, [9] characterizes the financial fraud as "the abuse of a profit organi-
zation's system without necessarily direct legal consequences". This definition 
expresses the abuse of a financial system. 
Summarizing these definitions, in this work, we consider as a financial fraud 
every deliberate criminal act which abuses a profit organization's system with the 
aim of personal and financial gains. 
B) The Different Kinds of Fraud 
Figure 1.1 illustrates four categories of financial fraud: bank fraud, insurance fraud, 
security and commodities fraud and other types related financial fraud [25] and 
for each category distinguishes different fraudulent activities including Credit Card 
Fraud, Money Laundering, Automobile Insurance fraud, Crop Insurance fraud, 
Healthcare insurance Fraud, mass marketing fraud or Corporate Fraud. 
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Notice that, money laundering is included in the Bank Fraud category. This 
category is defined by Connell University Law School (CULS) as "whoever knowingly 
executes, or attempts ta execute, a scheme or artifice (1) ta defraud a financial 
institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or 
other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 
1.2.2 Money Laundering 
After having situated money laundering among other kinds of fraud, this subsection 
proposes a better understanding of the concept of money laundering through first a 
definition of what is called "money laundering" based on several definitions proposed 
by different authors. Then the process of money laundering is presented through 
its three stages: the placement, the layering and the integration. Finally, the most 
common tools and techniques used by money launderers are exposed. 
A) Definition 
The FBI describes money laundering as "the process by which criminals conceal or 
disguise the proceeds of their crimes or convert those proceeds into goods and ser-
vices. It allows criminals to inject their illegal money into the stream of commerce, 
thus corrupting financial institutions and the money supply and giving criminals 
unwarranted economic power" [25]. 
Money laundering is also characterized as "a process to make illegitimate income 
appear legitimate; this is also the process by which criminals attempt to conceal the 
true origin and ownership of the proceeds of their criminal activity" [21]. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7 
The HM Treasury defines Money laundering as " the term usually used to describe 
the ways in which criminals process illegal or "dirty" money derived from the proceeds 
of any illegal activity (e.g the proceeds of drug-dealing, human trafficking, fraud, 
embezzlement, insider trading, bribery, theft or tax evasion) through a succession 
of transfers and deals until the source of illegally acquired funds is obscured and 
the money takes on the appearance of legitimate or "clean" funds or assets" (HM 
Treasury, 2004 cited by [15]). 
Through the previous definitions we can highlight the following important ele-
ments characterizing money laundering: 
• Hiding the origin and the ownership of illegitimate activities' benefits in trans-
forming dirty money into clean fonds ; 
By the following means: 
• Disguising benefits of a crime in converting those benefits into goods and 
services ; 
• Inserting illegal money into the economic system by means of a succession of 
transfers and deals; 
B) Process 
The ML process is a complex process involving many actors in many countries us-
ing many accounts in many financial institutions [26]. This subsection describes 
the different stages composing this process highlighting its complexity. This de-
scription allows to understand the international aspect of the ML detection and the 
importance to have an implication in the ML track by all financial institutions of 
all countries together to efficiently detect money launderers. 
The money laundering process can be viewed as a cycle of three money launder-
ing stages: the placement, the layering and the integration [15, 8]. The placement 
( the first stage) performs the transfer of illegal benefits into the financial system 
avoiding detection by transforming physical currency into other assets ( ex: via busi-
ness activities ... ). The goal of this step is to remove fonds as far as possible from its 
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origins [4]. The layering (the second stage) tries to create distance from the source 
of the illegal activities in generating many layers of transactions. The layering create 
a web of financial transactions for the purpose of looking like legitimate financial 
activities [4]. Finally, the integration ( the third stage) ensures the reinsertion of 
laundered money into the economy. This stage is performed by "aggregating illicit 
fonds from various legitimate commercial activities and financial systems". 





1 RegiooA 1 
lntergrntion 
company 
Figure 1.2: Money Laundering procedure [8] 
As illustrated, the ML process involves many agents and integrates many entities 
( companies, banks, etc.). At each stage, the laundered money placed in a bank 
account involves a financial institution. Consequently, at the end of this process, 
many institutions have been involved in the money laundering. The detection is more 
difficult at the beginning of this process (placement and layering stages) because the 
amount of money to launder is divided in many small sums difficult to detect. In 
contrary, at the end of this process ( at the integrating stage), all these small sums 
are aggregated to be integrated in the financial system. In this level, the amount 
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of money in higher and the placement on a bank account is tricky. Indeed, it's 
confronted to a large amount of money that the origins are analyzed, that the 
profile of account's owner are studied, etc. Consequently, it's at this level that the 
detection is the more conclusive [26]. 
C) ML Tools and Techniques 
The complexity of the ML process is increased by the more and more advanced 
techniques used by criminals. Moreover, even if money laundering was some years 
ago limited to personal gain from the drug traffic, now this term also points out 
financial terrorism [4]. Common techniques and tools of money laundering can be 
summarized through Structuring, Front companies, Misinvoicing, Shell companies, 
Wire transfers, Mirror-image trading, and Parallel systems [4]. 
The first technique,Structuring, refers to the division of large deposit ( over 10,000 
dollars) to avoid reporting required for all transactions over 10,000 dollars. The use 
of front companies can also be useful to money launderers because such companies do 
not necessary need financial institutions and these companies can also perform legal 
activities making it difficult to detect ML. The misinvoicing of international trade 
transfers is another common technique of money laundering. The fourth technique 
is the use of Shell corporations. The term "Shell corporation" is defined by the 
Financial Action Task Force as a corporation or institution "that does not conduct 
any commercial or manufacturing business or any form of commercial operation in 
the country where their registered office is located". Next, the use of electronic 
funds transfers or wire transfers is another mean to layer illicit funds. The mirror-
image trading schemes "involves buying contracts for one account while selling an 
equal number of contracts from another one. Both accounts are controlled by the 
same person, thus any profit or loss is effectively netted" . Finally, it is also possible 
that laundered money never transits through the mainstream financial system but 
through "an underground banking system such as the Hawala and Hundi system in 
India or parallel banking systems in China" [ 4]. 
It's important to notice that these tools and techniques constantly evolve and 
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adapt themselves to the detection [26]. 
The current analysis concerns techniques and tools involving the mainstream 
banking system: the structuring, the misinvoicing, electronic transfers, and the 
mirror-image trading schemes and the use of shell corporations. 
1.3 The TF1 Framework in ML 
The previous sections of the introduction have presented the definition of the concept 
of money laundering, its process, the common used tools and techniques and its 
position among other kinds of fraud. 
In this section, an important framework considered as the cornerstone for all the 
analysis of the lack of efficiency in ML detection is proposed. This framework is 
called the TFI framework [5]. This one is illustrated by figure 1.3. 
--------------
Figure 1.3: TFI framework [5] 
"The TFI model conceptualizes an information system as being itself comprised 
of three different but interrelated systems" [5]. Its name refers to the three systems 
composing this model: the technical system, the formal system and the informal 
system. This model illustrates the fact that a technical system (hardwares, soft-
wares, protocols, technology design, interfaces, etc) is embedded in and influenced 
by a formal system ( attributes of the system which are documented and formalized 
in rules, procedures, etc) which is itself embedded in and influenced by an informal 
system (culture, beliefs, values of the members of the system) [5]. 
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This framework can be applied to money laundering and allows us to understand 
the relationships between the technical AML solutions, the regulations around it 
and the AML staff and departments composing the informal environment around 
technical solutions. In the context of AML systems, the technical level consists of 
AML softwares. The formal level involves norms as well at the trans-national level 
as at the national one. Finally, the informal level consists on the attitudes and 
beliefs towards money laundering, the motivation, the moral responsibility and the 
implication of the AML staff [5]. 
Table 1.4 applied the TFI framework to money laundering. 
TF1 in ML 
Level Factors 
Technical Adoption of ML profiling is surrounded by both technical and economic ambiguity. 
Formai 
Abundance of norms atthe transnational, national and local level, Abstract norms are 
interpreted accordingto particular priorities and interests. 
Generalised disbelief in the goals of the activity, as well as the effectiveness of the tools being 
used. Attitude vary with size of banks and the nature of activity, but not with prier existence of 
Informai AML tools. Pacement of the AML decision maker at board level seems to offer legitimacy and 
facilitate the avaibility of resources. The treat of fines, as opposed to actual fines, also seem to 
influence action. 
Figure 1.4: TFI in ML [5] 
Through this framework it's easier to understand that not only AML technical 
solutions are responsible for the lack of efficiency of ML detection. Indeed, the 
technical aspect of ML detection is embedded in two other systems; the formal 
system relating regulation actors and the informal system which is more oriented 
to AML staff, their motivation and implication in the ML detection. As explained, 
"group acting in different informal environments react differently to the same formal 
or technical element" and then a same technical solution can be more or less efficient 
according toits formal and informal environment. 
Based on these interrelated systems and on the evidence that not only technical 
systems are responsible for the lack of efficiency of the ML detection exercise, the 
analysis presented in this thesis is divided into three levels: the technical level, the 
formal level and the informal one. Moreover, this thesis highlights the relation and 
the dependence between these systems. This interdependancy is often forgiven in 
articles about money laundering which only deal with one system (the technical 
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in proposing softwares, the formal in proposing directives and legislations , or the 
informal in explaining difficulties within financial institutions). 
1.4 Structure of the Work 
This introduction has firstly presented the scope of this work situating money laun-
dering among the other kinds of frauds. Secondly, the presentations of the ML 
process and of the common used ML techniques and tools have highlighted the com-
plexity of this field involving many agents, many entities in many countries. The last 
section of this introduction has proposed the TFI framework applied to money laun-
dering highlighting the importance of an analysis based on the three independent 
and interrelated systems ( the technical, formal and informal systems). 
In the purpose to identify the sources for the lack of efficiency of the ML detection 
performed by financial institutions, these three areas (technical, formal and informal) 
are investigated through chapters 2, 3, 4. 
Chapter 2 presents the technical AML system. It firstly identifies the limits of 
currently implemented systems which could decrease the detection performance and 
which are highlighted by interviewed experts. Next, these limits are translated into 
additional required qualities for a more efficient and suitable AML software. Finally, 
through the investigation of new AML solutions proposed by the literature, some 
techniques are proposed to respond to the highlighted required qualities with the 
aim to improve the ML detection at the technical level. 
Chapter 3 highlights limits for an efficient ML detection at the formal level. This 
chapter identifies two sources for the lack of efficiency at the formal level: (1) the lack 
of strictness in the interpretation of international recommendations and directives 
into national laws, and (2) the lack of strictness in the translation of these national 
laws into measures and procedures by financial institutions at the local level. 
Chapter 4 explores the informal AML system with the goal to find some possible 
sources for the lack of efficiency of the ML detection at this level. Through two 
surveys and two interviews, some informal aspects are investigated in the purpose 
to highlight their influences on the ML detection performed by organizations: the 
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impact of the culture of organizations, their attitude towards money laundering, 
the implication and the motivation for the ML track from the senior manager, and 
the' AML staff capability, awareness and knowledge of anti-money laundering tools 
(technical AML system), ML process, banking process, etc. 
After the identification of some sources and reasons for the lack of efficiency of 
the ML detection at the technical, formal and informal level, chapter 5 proposes 
some recommendations for each level to improve this detection. 
Chapter 2 
The Technical AML System 
Financial institutions are required to translate national AML laws into procedures 
and measures to detect ML cases (see chapter 3) [14, 15]. One measure is the use of 
technical systems. Indeed, considering the complexity of the ML process (see sub-
section Process in sectionl.2.2), the amount of tools and techniques used by money 
, launderers which constantly evolve ( see subsection ML tools and Techniques in sec-
tionl.2.2), and the large amount of transactions and accounts to deal, the use of a 
technical AML software is required to perform an efficient detection. 
As explained through the TFI model (section 1.3), the technical system is the 
most embedded one in the ML information system. This technical aspect is pre-
sented in this chapter. In the purpose to identify the sources for the lack of efficiency 
of the ML detection which can corne from the technical system, some experts are 
interviewed and the already implemented techniques are analyzed in the purpose to 
highlight the possible current limits of those systems which could decrease the de-
tection performance. These limits are translated in additional required qualities for 
a more efficient and suitable AML solution. Finally, some techniques are proposed 
to respond to these required qualities. 
14 
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2.1 The Market of AML Solutions 
Since September 11, 2001, more and more AML solutions are proposed on the market 
of AML solutions creating a strong concurrency. In addition to SAS with their "SAS 
Anti Money Laundering" other providers are present with other solutions as ACI 
with their" ACI Automated Case Management System for Anti-Money Laundering 
[33], Norkom with their "Norkom's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) solution" [39], 
Fiserv [36],I-sight [38], Mantas Inc., 
Figure 2.1 presents a ranking of the most important AML solutions currently 
implemented on the market [6]. Each provider propose a different solution but all 
these systems include some similar components as the following ones: the customer 
knowledge, transaction control, conformity report, investigation tools [43]. 
Antl-Money Laundering Sofulions. 2006-
ABCD VendorVlew: Transactlon Montorlng 
Adllânced TèC:hno'logv 
(and technical flelribUity) 
Figure 2.1: AML Solutions 2006 [6] 
2.2 Used Techniques in Currently Implemented 
AML Solutions 
According to the experts in fraud detection interviewed for this analysis [27, 26], 
these solutions are confronted to some limits. Indeed, these experts reveal that de-
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cision support systems currently implemented to fight against money laundering are 
enough to respect imposed recommendations and directives but are not efficient to 
really stop money laundering. Indeed, these systems forgiven that the human ex-
pertise takes the major place in the ML detection. They only consider the technical 
mechanisms [27] without reintegrating the human expertise performed in previous 
detection to improve future detection. Another highlighted problem [26] is the fact 
that these provided solutions require a specific database format. Therefore financial 
institutions have to adapt their database to the implemented AML system. More-
over, they produce too much errors in the detection and consequently a waste of 
time for human experts [27]. Another interviewed expert [28] moderates these as-
sertions and considers that currently implemented solutions could be improved but 
are already efficient if they are correctly and efficiently used. For this expert, it's 
not a lack of efficiency of proposed tools but in the use of these tools which require 
being configured according the nature of activities of the institutions which use it. 
This configuration requires a technical knowledge in addition to knowledge in the 
ML and banking process. According to this expert, it's really rare to find all this 
knowledge aggregated in a same AML team of an organization. 
In sum, these experts highlights different problems of currently implemented 
AML solutions: (1) a lack of learning based on previous detection performed by 
human experts, (2) a specific database format required, (3) a configuration which is 
difficult, and ( 4) too much errors in the detection (too much false positive and false 
negative suspicious cases). 
This section aims to understand from where corne the limits highlighted by the 
interviewed experts. In this purpose, some articles from the literature in this field 
[13, 14, 15, 32, 21, 20, 25, 7, 24, 23, 30, 8, 22, 5, 4, 19, 9, 18, 44] describing some 
techniques used in currently implemented AML solutions and their limits are used. 
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2.2.1 The most Common Used Techniques: Description and 
Limits 
This literature reveals that the majority of proposed solutions are based on data-
mining tools to detect and predict ML cases. 
"Data mining techniques are suited for identifying trends and patterns in large 
datasets" [16] cited in [21]. The detection of ML patterns through financial transac-
tions require techniques which can detect suspicious cases among a large amount of 
data taking into account a large amount of dimensions ( customer x product x geog-
raphy x time). These requirements can be met by data-mining techniques. Indeed, 
these methods can be as well predictive as descriptive. It means that some future 
trends and some current characteristics, profiles hidden by the large amount of data 
can be highlighted. 
Many predictive and descriptive methods as clustering, outlier detection, sup-
port vector machine (SVM), histogram analysis based on a discretisation process, 
correlation analysis, visualization, decision trees, link analysis, etc. are today im-
plemented in AML solutions to detect or predict unusual customer behaviors. 
As already mentioned above, the interviewed experts have highlighted the fol-
lowing limits to theses currently implemented solutions: (1) a lack of learning based 
on previous detection performed by human experts, (2) a specific database format 
which is required, (3) a configuration which is difficult, and ( 4) too much errors in 
the detection ( too much false positive and false negative suspicious cases). Let us 
explain these limits. 
A) A Lack of Learning 
The investigated literature reveals that the majority of implemented solutions are 
predefined rule-based solutions. 
These rules are build based on governmental list of risky countries, people, pro-
fessions but also on rules created by financial institutions themselves to detect sus-
picious cases according the nature of their activity ( e.g. the amount of money of a 
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transaction considered as suspect for a certain profession) [26]. 
Due to the predefined aspect of these rules, each time laws change, the system has 
to be redesigned and reconstruct to stay efficient in the ever changing ML context. 
Moreover, due to their static and predefined characteristics, these rules can be easily 
learned and evaded by money launders [24]. 
Another problem presented by these rules-based solutions is their inability to 
learn or generalize. Indeed, Solutions using this technique cannot learn and gen-
eralize new patterns or integrate previous performed detections as rules for future 
detections. They can only match patterns that they already know [14, 15]. 
The articles [14] and [15] also notice that solutions based on predefined rules 
present an inability to detect ML schemes of smaller amount. This can be linked to 
ineffective thresholds proposed by the rules [28]. 
These solutions also suffer of high false positive problems. Indeed, too many 
transactions are marked as suspicious but are not [14, 15]. 
B) A Specific Data base Format 
Another most important problem with currently sold solutions is the fact that to 
be implemented into financial institutions, they need to have a specific database 
format available. Therefore, financial institutions have to transform their currently 
used database to suit with the technical proposed AML solution [26]. 
C) Configuration Difficulties 
The used solutions have the capacity to deal with large datasets with many attributes 
and dimensions but need a parameter selection by the user to be performing [28] 
( e.g for the clustering, the user has to select the number of iterations, the number 
of clusters, the seed parameter, etc. [12]). This parameter selection is complicated 
for people who have no knowledge in data-mining. And this parameter selection is 
directly linked to the expected result. Therefore, it's needed to know what you are 
looking for, what you really expect from the used tool, what a data-mining specialist 
with no knowledge in the ML and banking systems can't do. 
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D) Too rnany Detection Errors 
The detection performed by investigation tools conducts to too many false positive 
suspicious cases [26]. Therefore, human experts have to control all these cases even 
if they are not suspicious in reality. 
The hypotheses for this too high rate of errors can be: (1) a clustering result 
which is not accurate enough, (2) a lack of learning capability which can reintegrate 
the results of previous detections, and (3) a lack of mechanisms bringing additional 
knowledge which can be helpful for future detections. 
First, in used data-mining tools, suspicious activities detection is essentially seen 
as an outlier detection problem in certain solutions [24, 45]. Nevertheless, a simple 
detection of suspicious money laundering transactional behavior patterns cannot 
be only made by means of a simple clustering or local outlier detection. Indeed, 
when a clustering is performed, two categories can be identified: large and small 
category. These categories respectively represent normal transactional behavioral 
patterns and abnormal ones. In the point of view of local outlier detection, all sub-
jects of the small category are outliers compared to those in the large category. But 
this categorization cannot be applied to all industries i.e. for some industries normal 
and abnormal behavioral patterns depend on the period (seasonal industries, etc). 
Secondly, this amount of errors can also corne from the fact that decisions of 
experts about cases that the system had detected as suspect are not reintegrated 
into the system to improve future detections. If these decisions were reintegrated 
in the system, the false positive suspicious cases already detected in previous inves-
tigations would be considered by the system has not suspicious. By this learning 
mechanism the detection could be more accurate and the number of false positive 
would be decreased. 
Lastly, mechanisms allowing link analysis, sequences of transactions identifica-
tion, correlation and trends analysis, visualization, the calculation of the probability 
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of suspicion for a kind of transaction or account, etc. could be used in addition to 
traditional classification tools to create additional knowledge which can be stored 
and reused by the system for future investigation and which can consequently pro-
vide a more accurate detection. 
Currently, some of these mechanisms are already used but are confronted to some 
limits. 
For example, link analysis tools are already used in investigation to discover 
information about criminals and criminal's networks (e.g.: Offenders of the same 
supply chain)[8]. "The main function of link analysis is to retrieve information from 
raw data which is related to entities such as bank accounts, telephone records and 
criminal reports. The datais then processed and presented in a structured format. 
Link analysis further analyzes the information and identifies the relationship be-
tween the entities.[ ... ] Link analysis can be time-consuming and requires substantial 
amount of manual work. Commercial software's labeled as link analysis tools only 
provide functions for visualizing manually constructed criminal networks. In these 
systems, associations between entities are often required to be input by the user 
manually "[8]. These systems "provide generic functions for all types of crimes and 
heavily rely on user's expertise on the domain knowledge of the domain of the crime 
for successful detection. As a result, they are less effective in detecting patterns in 
certain crimes" [8]. Moreover, association analysis can be extremely time-consuming 
for large dataset. This issue conducts to a lack of effectiveness in the detection of 
patterns for certain crimes [8]. 
Moreover, currently, data are only treated in an individual level; no analysis is 
performed based on a sequence of transaction which could reduce the number of false 
negative. Indeed, some transactions which is not considered as suspect in isolation 
could be if they are in sequence of transactions with similar characteristics. 
2.2.2 In Sum 
In the field of AML and financial terrorism, the final decision is to decide if a trans-
action is suspect or not and if this one needs of specific actions or not. This domain 
can be characterized by a large amount of data, many dimensions to take into ac-
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count and a really quick data flow. Moreover, it's a domain wherein each error has 
important consequences for the economy. Hence, it is necessary to develop systems 
which efficiently detect and alert suspicious behaviors through transactions and op-
erations, and which allow to treat these suspicious behaviors. It's an action decision 
specific for each behavior or transaction that has to be taken by several specific 
experts. This decision is based on report from the system, and also on knowledge 
and experience of experts. 
According to interviewed experts, many limits to currently implemented AML 
system can be highlighted: (1) a lack of learning based on previous detection per-
formed by human experts, (2) a specific database format required, (3) a configuration 
which is difficult, and ( 4) too much errors in the detection (too much false positive 
and false negative suspicious cases). 
These limits reflect some additional important qualities required for a more effi-
cient AML solution which would be more suitable for the ill-structured, changeable 
and complex ML and financial systems. 
These technical requirements are the following ones: (1) adding a learning ca-
pability to AML system, (2) adding mechanisms which can bring a more accurate 
detection, and (3) the need to have a system which canuse different database format. 
Concerning the difficulties to configure systems, a solution could be bring in each 
financial institution at informal level (see chapter 4). 
A) A Learning Capability to AML System 
Most of currently implemented solutions use only predefined rules and have no learn-
ing or generalization capabilities. These solutions are confronted to some problems. 
First, these solutions require too much business redesign and reconstruction each 
time rules change. 
Moreover, these techniques due to their static aspect are too easy to learn for 
money launderers. 
Finally, the human expertise performed in previous investigation are not reinte-
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grated in and reused by the system for future investigation which is a waste of time 
for human experts who have to control all detection from the system. 
These limits are particularly problematic in the ever changing ML context where 
money launderer's techniques constantly evolve and which involves a large amount 
of transactions to investigate. 
A more intelligent, real-time, dynamic and self-adaptable technique with learning 
and generalization abilities is then required. By its learnability this system could 
learn and generalize new patterns from previous detections and not staying with 
patterns they already know and which are integrated through static and predefined 
rules. 
B) A more Accurate Detection 
In the purpose to perform the detection with a minimum of errors ( a minimum of 
false positive and negative detected cases), some techniques can be used to bring ad-
ditional knowledge which could be stored and reused for future detection and which 
can bring more accurate detection results. The following mechanisms can be used 
in this way: link analysis tools, correlations and trends identification tools, mecha-
nisms to calculate the probability of suspicion of a kind of account or transaction, 
sequence analysis tools, etc. 
C) Different Database Format 
It should also be useful for financial institution to have a system which doesn't im-
pose a strict database format. Indeed, it's really constrained for financial institution 
to have to change its database format to fit with the implemented AML solution 
[26]. 
2.3 New Proposed Solutions 
Considering criticisms formulated by interviewed AML experts about the ineffi.ciency 
of AML solutions currently available on the market, section 2.2 has highlighted some 
additional qualities (not available in currently developed solutions) required for a 
CHAPTER 2. THE TECHNICAL AML SYSTEM 23 
more efficient AML solution. These requirements are the following ones: 1) adding 
a learning capability to AML system, (2) adding mechanisms which can bring a 
more accurate detection, and (3) the need to have a system which canuse different 
database format. 
In this section, we present some techniques which can provide these required 
qualities. These techniques corne from the investigation of new developed AML 
approaches proposed by the literature [13, 14, 15, 32, 21, 20, 25, 7, 24, 23, 30, 8, 22, 
5, 4, 19, 9, 18, 44]. 
2.3.1 A Learning Capability 
This subsection presents some techniques which can bring a learning capability to 
AML solutions: the use of knowledge repositories and neural network, and the use 
of intelligent agents. 
A) The Use of Knowledge Repositories and Neural Network 
The articles [21, 20] propose a knowledge based framework using a combination of 
' 
data-mining (DM) and natural computing techniques. This framework integrates 
learning capabilities through the use of knowledge repositories which record the 
results of previous detections of ML patterns, cases, behaviors, etc. Moreover a 
neural network is also used to provide an accurate classification based on the result 
on previous detection. 
Figure 2.2 presents this framework which can be seen as a succession of three 
steps/layouts: The pre-processing, the Data-Mining and the knowledge manage-
ment. 
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Figure 2.2: DM Architecture for detecting AML [21] 
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The preprocessing represents the ETL process (Export Transform and Load). 
This process consists on the extraction of data from data sources, the cleaning of 
those ones, and the integration in a data warehouse of customer information and 
transactions. 
The data-mining layer provides data-mining techniques to analyze transaction 
datasets as well at a descriptive level as at a predictive one. Transactions records 
are extracted from the data warehouse for analysis. In this level, aggregation of 
transactions with individual account, are also performed and provide additional 
information about the financial activity of an individual. "Clustering groups similar 
transactions and builds suspicious profiles; classification classifies customers into pre-
defined categories ofrisk [21]". In the purpose to provide an accurate classification, a 
neural network is used. The outputs of previous detections ( the final decision, taken 
by human experts, based on potentially suspicious cases provided by the system) 
1 
____________ I 
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are used by the neural network to create a ranking of the new potentially suspicious 
cases detected by the system. This ranking is based on the suspicious degree linked 
each detected transaction according previous detections ( false positive cases or false 
negative cases). 
The last layer, the knowledge management, represents the result of the previous 
investigations complemented with AML experts 'experience stored and analyzed. In 
this layer, rules and knowledge are generated. Different strategies are proposed to 
increase the performance. "For example, it integrates clustering results and learning 
results to build a decision tree for predicting suspicious cases [21]". 
In sum, the results of previous detection ( the final decision, taken by human 
experts, based on potentially suspicious cases provided by the system) are stored in 
knowledge repositories. This knowledge is used to calculate a degree of suspicious 
for transactions of a certain kind. This calculation is used by a neural network which 
establish a ranking of detected transactions. This learning mechanism provides a 
more accurate classification. 
B) The Use of Intelligent Agents 
The article [14] proposes a real-time exception management decision model which 
uses intelligent agents and their properties to provide an intelligent, self-adaptable, 
flexible, autonomous, reactive and proactive model able to learn. 
This model combines three approaches: (1) the known making-decision model -
the Simon's model - adapted to the ML environment which in the intelligent agent 
technology is applied [13], (2) The Cynefin Sense-Making framework [14] and (3) 
BAM logical layered architecture [14]. 
The Simon's model is constituted by four phases [15]: the intelligence phase, the 
design phase, the choice phase and the review phase. This model can be adapted 
to the ML environment in using intelligent agents (IAs). Due to the complexity, 
the structure of AML, the large amount of data, etc, IAs can be useful to analyze 
all transactions with the needed corporate authority to access to any data. In-
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deed, thanks to their proactivity and reactivity, they are able to detect suspicious 
behaviors hidden among voluminous data[15]. 
As defined by the French N ormalization Association, an intelligent agent is "an 
object using artificial intelligence techniques: it adapts his behavior to its envi-
ronment and acts as a learning sub-system by memorizing its anterior experience. 
It enriches the system it uses by adding automatic fonctions treating, controlling, 
memorizing and transferring information." IAs are able to act without human in-
tervention or intervention of another system. These agents have a control on their 
own intern state and on their environment [13]. Properties of an IA are the fol-
lowing ones: an IA is autonomie, enable to communicate and cooperate, enable to 
reason and react to its environment and is mobile. It also includes one or more of 
the following elements: a predefined knowledge base, and an inference motor (which 
allows having complex reasoning). Moreover, it can also include a knowledge acqui-
sition system and a learning mechariism [17]. A multi-agents system (MAS) is group 
of agents which internet together in a specific environment to reach together their 
goals. They take other agents knowledge and capabilities to fill their own limits [15]. 
The second approach on which the Real-time Exception Management Decision 
Model is based is the Cynefin Sense-Making Framework. This framework provides 
a help for unspecified problems and allows to classify them. This framework is 
divided in several domains: - known - "known causes and effect. Cause and effect 
relationship are generally linear". - Knowable- "knowable causes and effects. While 
stable cause and effect relationships exist in this domain, they may not full y know, 
or they may be known only by limited group of people". - Complex- "complex 
relationships. There are causes and effect relationships between the agents, but the 
no. of agents and the no. of relationships defy categorization or analytic techniques. 
Emergent patterns can be perceived but not predicted". - Chaos - "there are no 
perceivable relationships, the system is turbulent, there is nothing to analyze; and, 
waiting for patterns to emerge is a waste of time." According to these different types 
of domain the proposed decision model has to act differently. 
For a Known domain, the decision model has "to sense incoming data, categorize 
that data, and then respond in accordance with the predetermined practice". For 
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un knowable domain the decision model has to sense incoming data, analyze that 
data, and then respond in accordance with expert advice or interpretation of that 
analysis". For a complex domain, the decision model has "to create probes to make 
the patterns or potential patterns more visible ( sense) before we take any action 
(respond). And for a chaotic domain, the model has "to act, quickly and decisively, 
to reduce the turbulence; then to sense immediately the reaction to that intervention 
so that we can respond accordingly". 
The third approach used in the build Real-Time Exception Management De-
cision Madel (RTEMDM) is the basic BAM logical layered architecture. Which 
include three layers: the Event Absorption Layer, the Event Processing and Fil-
tering and the Event Action, Delivery and Display. BAM is defined as "providing 
real-time access to critical business performance indicators to improve the speed 
and effectiveness of business operations. Unlike traditional real-time monitoring, 
BAM drams its information from multiple application systems and other internal 
and external sources, enabling a broader and richer view of business activities" '[14]. 
The figure 2.3 presents the model. 



















A seen in the figure 2.3, in the intelligence phase, two monitoring agents are 
presents; a client profile monitoring agent and a transaction monitoring agent. The 
purpose of these two monitoring agents is to provide a risk assessment report. This 
one will be send to agents in the following phase; the design phase. 
The design phase processes according to the different types of ML indicators: in 
the case of known or knowable ML indicators; the categorizing agent categorizes the 
known activities based on existing pattern. The analyzing agent is responsible for 
knowable activities. This one can find suspicious patterns behind large amount of 
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data. In the case of complex ML indicators, the risk report produced by monitoring 
agents is send to the probing agent of the design phase. This agent rank custoID:ers 
according their degree of suspicious. The discovered pattern is send to the sensing 
agent to identify suspicious behaviors [14]. 
In sum, by their own properties, intelligent agents can bring by themselves learn-
ability arid self-adaptability. These properties are completely suitable for the ML 
context. Indeed, thanks to business rules and business strategies extracted from 
business model which constitute the specific knowledge of intelligent agent, those 
ones are able to reason about business actions for AML. The implementation of 
business rules into intelligent agent makes them able to act autonomously with flex-
ibility and adaptability [15]. Based on situational awareness and real-time decisions, 
each agent manages its specific goal and is able to internet with other agents [13]. 
2.3.2 Mechanisms for a More Accurate Detection 
The second additional quality required for a more suitable and efficient solution is 
the integration of mechanisms which can decrease the number of false positive and 
negative suspicious cases detected by the system 
In the purpose, some solutions are proposed:(l) the integration of a learning 
mechanism, (2) of a local outlier factor algorithm, (3) of a sequence matching, ( 4) of 
visualization tools, and (5) the integration of algorithms which calculate the degree 
of suspicion of a persan and the degree of association between two entities. 
A) The Use of the Learning Capability 
The learning capability which is added to system (see subsection 2.3.1) can provide 
an accurate classification, thanks to the additional knowledge they bring based on 
previous detections. 
As presented, the learning capability of a system can bring additional knowledge 
as a ranking of detected transaction according their degree of suspicion, the previ-
ously detected ML patterns, the previously detected suspicious cases and behavior, 
etc. 
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B) The Use of a Local Outlier Factor (LOF) Algorithm 
In many AML solutions, the classification is seen as an outlier detection problem 
[45]. In these solutions, the clustering process categorizes analyzed points into two 
categories: the small category (SC) and the large category (LC). The SC is com-
posed by points with an abnormal behavior while LC includes points with a normal 
behavior. But points of SC are not all suspicious [45]. 
Therefore, [45] proposes an outlier factor (LOF) algorithm. This algorithm "mea-
sures the deviant degree of point of the small category (representing points with an 
abnormal behavior) from large category (representing points with a normal behav-
ior)". More the analyzed point deviate from the LC, the higher the LOF value is. 
When all points have received their LOF value, the information about how the trans-
action is suspicious is then available. It's also possible to rank possible suspicious 
transactions ( detected by the clustering) in fonction of their LOF value. 
This mechanism provides an accurate classification with less false positive. 
C) The Use of a Sequence Matching 
The amount of false negative and positive can be decreased by a sequence match-
ing. Indeed, according to [24], the history of each transaction of each account and 
transactions information from other accounts in a peer group can be used to identify 
suspicious sequences from large volume of transactions. 
Viewing transactions as temporal sequences allow an easier detection of suspi-
cious activities and allows to decrease the number of transactions which would not 
have been considered as suspect in isolation. This method provides a comparison 
between sequences and historical information. By this way, the detection of suspi-
cious transaction can be performed according to its own trend which reduces the 
number of false positive and negative consequent to human-set threshold. 
D) The Use of Visualisation Tools 
As already mentioned in section 2.2, most of currently used AML solutions use 
predefined rules. These rules can be seen as a list of keywords based on predefined 
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patterns. In the purpose to provide an accurate detection, [7] presents, in addition 
to th~ classification, a visualization system. 
This visualization system includes four tightly coordinated views of transaction 
activity; (1) The keyword network view, (2) The heatmap view, (3) the search by 
example tools and ( 4) a new visualization called StringBeads. Before any analysis 
or visualization, data are grouped according the sending and receiving accounts and 
visualizations use accounts instead of each individual transaction. In view of the 
enormous amount of accounts, a clustering of those ones is needed. This clustering 
groups accounts based on frequency of keywords that occurs in the transactions of 
the account. 
The figure 2.4 shows the entire system with the heatmap(top left), search by ex-
ample (top right), keyword graph (lower right), and strings and beads (lower left). 
The keyword network view represents the relation between keywords by means of 
a simple network graph. Keywords are related if they appear together in the same 
transaction. The heatmap view shows the relationship between accounts and key-
words. The search by example tool allows to discover accounts of similar activities 
using some prototypes created on the discovering of previous results. Finally, the 
Stringbeads visualization depicts transaction over time . 
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In sum, by this way, predefined keywords are used but supported by visualiza-
tion tools which highlight relationships between keywords, between keywords and 
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account, which discover accounts with similar characteristics in the purpose to dis-
cover other suspicious accounts. This mechanism brings additional knowledge which 
can provide a more accurate future detection. 
E) The Use of Algorithrns which Calculate the Degree of Suspicion of 
a Person and the Degree of Association between two Entities 
In section 2.2 about currently implemented AML solutions we have discovered that 
link analysis tools are already proposed to highlight the relationship between data. 
But these solutions provide only visualization tools and not really a data analysis. 
The article [8] proposes a new method to detect the relation between data. In this 
method the degree of suspicion of a person and the degree of association between two 
entities are calculated via algorithms applied for each family or colleague members 
in cluster. By this mean, criminal networks could be identified and the classification 
can be more accurate. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates this method. Four components constitute the system; an 
event-based database for criminal records, Data Preprocessing for criminal detection, 
Clusters and association detection, and visualization. 
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Figure 2.5: System design [8] 
First, criminal information is stored in the database as abjects with attributes 
(time, location ... ). An association between two abjects represents a link between two 
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criminal entities. Money laundering occurring all around the world presents common 
characteristics. Data preprocessing in this model use a knowledge base to store 
crime specific heuristics. Criminal associations are identified based via the following 
attributes: Corruption Network (suspects use a network of trusted persons), Crime 
period (when the suspect is appointed as a key officer), bank transactions (frequent 
deposits ... ), suspicious entities ( use of anonymous companies ... ), suspicious regions, 
suspect's career, suspect's age, suspect's salary, transaction behavior (number of 
transactions, type of transactions ... ). 
In this method the degree of suspicion of a person and the degree of association 
between two entities are calculated via algorithms applied for each family or col-
league members in cluster. The degree of association between two people is higher 
if two people have the same properties or are parts of the same transactions. The 
degree of suspicion is established by a score. The tables 2.6 and 2. 7 respectively 
summarize the algorithms and the scoring scheme. 
, Smnman-· ". . . ". 
A]go. 1 Identifies the fümilv member.s of the suspect durmg a given 1Period. 
.llJgo. 2 Identifies the colleagues of the suspect during a given period . 
Algo.3 Cakulates the degœe of suspicion of the su.spect and its colleagues 
i.vithin the cluste:r based on the typeinamre of occupations. 
Algo.4 Calculates the degree of suspicion of the smpect and :its 
colleagues/fumily membern withm the cmster. In thls: a1goritbm,. baok 
mwsactions ber.,,.Teen the suspect and ifs colleaguesl:fumily members 
are med for calcu.]ation. 
Algo.5 Calculates the degree of suspicion of ail members witbm the cmster 
based on the members' bank acttv:ities. 
A]go. 6 Calcula.tes: the degree of suspicion of all members ,vithi:n the cfü.1S1te1· 
based on the existence of shell companies. 
A]go. 7 Cakulates the degree of association beh.veen nvo e.ntities. 
Figure 2.6: Algorithms [8] 
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Co:ildïtion Point(s} ~lliorit~c 
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· · Degrée ofsu.s-pîcion .. 
Family membeir of the suspect 1 1 
Head of finance i-elated departm.en.t 1 3 
Staff membeir of depaitment u:ndeir investigation 2 3 
(snspicious department) 




Transaction beh-.een suspects' bank accmmts 2 4 
Large bank traasactions 1 5 
Degree of association ,',' ·. 
Collea:e;ae association 1 7 
F amily ~.sociation 2 7 
Bank activi1ly association 2 7 
Figure 2.7: Degree of suspicion and association [8] 
2.3.3 The Need to Have a System which can Use Different 
Database Format 
Currently, provided AML solutions require a specific database format. 
To solve this problem we can take a leaf out of the business intelligence: 
In Business Intelligence (BI) the three-tier architecture is often used to place 
an interface between databases with different format and the used BI application. 
The different used databases have a different format (perhaps imposed by anoher 
application of by a law for example). In the purpose to be used with the application 
and its format requirements, a datawarehouse is created with the suitable format. 
By this way, the BI application can use this formated datawarehouse. 
This method can be used to solve this problem. Between the detection appli-
cation and the database of financial instutions, a formated datawarehouse can be 
created. The data from financial institutions will be extracted and loaded in a 
datawarehouse which will be used by the detection system. 
Note that this three-tiers architecture and above all the use of a datawarehouse 
are confronted to some limits. Indeed needing an exportation, transformation and 
loading, the data are not available in real time in the datawarehouse. This can be 
a serious problem for our domain. 
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A community is today responsible to salve this problem of real-time and their 
results could be used to salve our problem. 
2.4 Conclusion of The Technical Part 
In the aim to identify the sources for the lack of efficiency of the ML detection per-
formed by financial institutions, three levels have been analyses 1.3 : the technical, 
formal and informal levels. 
This chapter analyses the technical level and highlights the reasons for the lack 
of efficient in the ML detection which can corne from implemented AML softwares. 
Even if the currently proposed solutions are already efficient if they are correctly 
used, interviewed experts highlight some limits which can be solved to improve the 
performance of AML systems. These limits, presented in section 2.2 are the follow-
ing ones: (1) a lack of learning based on previous detection performed by human 
experts, (2) a specific database format required, (3) a configuration which is difficult, 
and (4) too much errors in the detection (too much false positive and false negative 
suspicious cases). 
These limits reflect some additional important qualities required for a more effi-
cient AML solution which would be more suitable for the ill-structured, changeable 
and complex ML and financial systems. 
These technical requirements are the following ones: (1) adding a learning ca-
pability to AML systems, (2) adding mechanisms which can bring a more accurate 
detection, and (3) the need to have a system which canuse different database format. 
Concerning the difficulties to configure systems, a solution could be bring in each 
financial institution at informal level ( see chapter 4. 
A future work (see section 6.2) could have the aim to enrich these required qual-
ities through additional researches in the literature and some meeting with experts 
in this field. Nevertheless, even if this list of requirements is currently not exhaus-
tive, it brings some important indications to improve the efficiency of AML solutions. 
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Section 2.3 presents some techniques which can provide these required qualities. 
In the purpose to provide a learning capability to solutions based on data-mining 
techniques, knowledge repositories and neural network can be used. The results of 
previous detection (the final decision, taken by human experts, based on potentially 
suspicious cases provided by the system) are stored in knowledge repositories. This 
knowledge is used to link a degree of suspicion for some kind of transactions. This 
calculation is used by a neural network to establish a ranking of detected transac-
tions. 
The learning capability can be provided by a solution which uses intelligent 
agents for the investigation. By their own properties, intelligent agents bring learn-
ability by memorizing their anterior experience and their reasinning capability. 
Moreover, in collaboration with other agents, they can share knowledge they don't 
have in isolation. 
In the purpose to provide a more accurate detection with less false positive and 
negative suspicious cases, some mechanisms can be used to improve the classification. 
First, the use of leaning capability can provide an accurate classification thanks 
, to the additional knowledge they bring based on previous detections. 
Next, the use of a local outlier factor algorithm can measure the deviant degree 
of point of the category representing an abnormal behavior and points from the 
category representing a normal behavior. By this way, how the transaction is suspi-
cious is then availab~e and points in the abnormal behavior category can be ranked 
according their degree of suspicion. 
Thirdly, a sequence matching can also decrease the number of errors in the 
classification. Indeed, a transaction can be considered as non-suspicious in isolation 
but can be suspicious if we analyse the history of an account and if we take into 
account transactions information. 
The use of visualization tools to support the classification based on predefined 
keywords can also be useful to provide an accurate classification. Indeed, the visual-
ization can highlight relationship between keywords, between keywords and account, 
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and can discover accounts with similar characteristics in the purpose to discover 
other suspicious accounts. This mechanism brings additional knowledge which can 
provide a more accurate future detection. 
Finally, algorithms which calculate the degree of suspicion of a persan and the 
degree of association between two entities can also be useful to provide a better 
detection which can be based on the identification of criminal networks. 
To respond to the problem of systems which require a specific database format, 
a solution can be found through the three-tiers architecture which provides a kind 
of interface between datasets of financial institutions and AML softwares. This 
solution still presents some limits which are currently taken into account by all a 
community. The result of this research can help to solve our problem. 
Chapter 3 
The Formai AML System 
The TF1 model, presented on the section 1.3, proposes three systems evolving in the 
global AML information system: the technical, the formal and the informal AML 
systems. 
After the technical AML system presentation in chapter 2, the current one deals 
with the formal AML system. 
A formal system concerns attributes of the system which are documented and 
formalized in rules, procedures, etc. In the field of AML, a hierarchy among orga-
nizations formulating these rules can be identified [5]: trans-national organizations 
(e.g. the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)), national organizations (e.g. the 
regulators) and local organizations ( e.g. banks). Local organizations establish their 
own internal policies based on the interpretation of trans-national recommendations 
by national regulators according to their own national priorities. 
These three layers are presented in turn in the three first sections of this chapter. 
Then, some conclusions are drawn regarding the formal level. 
3.1 The Trans-national Level 
"Various international organizations are aware that money laundering and terrorist 
financing can greatly influence the global economy and the financial markets. That 
is why they have set up awareness-raising programs and urge political decision mak-
ers to take .measures to counter criminals and terrorism financiers and to prevent 
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that they could take full use of the proceeds of their criminal activities or for ter-
rorist financing purposes'" [35]. These international organizations are the FATF, 
the Egmont group, the European Union, the council of Europe, the UN, the IMF 
World Bank and the OECD. 
This section presents these international organizations which takes all actions 
to fight against money laundering. The FATF, the Egmont group, the council of 
Europe, the UN, the IMF World Bank and the OECD have no formal authority and 
only provides recommendations, guidelines, forum, and help to governments to fight 
against money laundering. Only the European Union publishes directives which 
have a formal authority. Moreover, the actions of the Egmont group, the European 
Union, the council of Europe, the UN, the IMF World Bank and the OECD are 
all based on the FATF recommendations which are considered as standards in this 
field. 
3.1.1 The FATF 
In the late 1980s the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is founded by the G7 
group in an international effort to fight against money laundering. Currently, 29 
countries and two international organizations (the European Commission and Gulf 
Cooperation Council) compose the FATF body [4]. 
In 1990, this independent inter-governmental entity which develops policies to 
fight against "money Laundering, financial terrorism and proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction" published 40 recommendations first to fight the usage of the 
financial system for drug traffic [3]. These recommendations are grouped into 3 
categories: legal measures (how legislative organs have to create a complete legal 
structure to fight), financial regulations (how governments should regulate their 
financial system) and international cooperation (how governments have to work to-
gether). The official FATF website notices that 8 new special recommendations had 
been added about financial terrorism after 11th September 2001 [37]. These new 
recommendations contain a set of measures to fight terrorism acts and organizations. 
These recommendations can be categorized in 3 groups [13]: (1) Requirements about 
client knowledge (KYC-Know your client)." KYC guidelines require or recommend 
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developing a keen understanding, through appropriate due diligence, of who the true 
beneficial owners and parties to transactions are, the source and intended use of 
funds, and the appropriateness and reasonableness of the business activity and pat-
tern of transactions in the context of business" [13] (IFAC,2002). (2) Requirements 
about suspicious activity reports (SAR) and (3) Requirements including antiterror-
ism (AT) in AML. 
Money Laundering can lead to destabilize the world economy but also implied 
other risks to which financial institutions are confronted like reputation risk, op-
erational risk, concentration risk and legal risk [20]. It's the reason why FATF 
invites all governments and financial regulators to take necessary measures (process 
and procedures) to fight with efficiency against money laundering, the financing of 
terrorism and against other illicit activities [31, 20]. Currently, 180 governments 
have adopted FATF recommendations and require all their financial institutions to 
"indentify, track, and in some sense control terrorist fonds - not only by blocking 
assets but also through stronger measures such as identity verification at account 
opening via government-supplied lists, and attention to the ongoing uses as well as 
the sources of fonds" [13]. 
It's important to notice that "the FATF recommendations are recognized as the 
global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) stan-
dard" [11]. This is this status of standard which conducts authors of the literature 
to consider the FATF as the only one entity responsible of recommendations formu-
lation at the international. 
The FATF have also arole of evaluator [35]. Indeed, some members of the FATF 
participate with other experts to the evaluation of states concerning the AML. Once 
this evaluation performed, the FATF gives some recommendations to improve the 
efficiency of the detection. 
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3.1.2 The Egmont Group 
A second entity at the trans-national level is the Egmont group of Financial Intelli-
gence Units (FIUs). "In 1995, a group of FIUs met at the Egmont Arenberg Palace 
in Brussels and decided to establish an informal group for the stimulation of inter-
national co-operation. Now, known as the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units, these FIUs meet regularly to find ways to cooperate, especially in the areas 
of information exchange, training and the sharing of expertise. 
The goal of the Egmont Group is to provide a forum for FIUs around the world 
to improve cooperation in the fight against money laundering and financing of ter-
rorism and to foster the implementation of domestic programs in this field. This 
support expands and systematizes international cooperation in the reciprocal ex-
change of information, increases the effectiveness of FIUs by offering training and 
promoting personnel exchanges to improve the expertise and capabilities of per-
sonnel employed by FIUs, fosters better and secure communication among FIUs 
through the application of technology, such as the Egmont Secure Web (ESW), also 
fosters increased coordination and support among the operational divisions of mem-
ber FIUs, promotes the operational autonomy of FIUs and finally also promotes the 
establishment of FIUs in conjunction with jurisdictions with an AML/CFT program 
in place, or in areas with a program in the early stages of development" [41]. 
This group has no formal authority and only provides support and encourage-
ments for a better cooperation and recommendations integration. For this reason, 
the Egmont group of Financial Intelligence Units is not considered as a responsible 
in the formulation of AML recommendations. 
It's important to notice that actions of the Egmont group is destined to govern-
ments and not to private institutions and individuals [28]. 
3.1.3 European Union 
"Since the nineties various measures to combat money laundering and terrorism 
financing have been taken at European level. The most important achievements 
are (1) various directives combating money laundering and terrorist financing were 
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adopted. The most recent one is the third directive (2005/60/EC), (2) Regula-
tion 1889 /2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on controls of cash 
entering or leaving the Community was adopted, (4) a Committee on the Preven-
tion of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing was created, in which CTIF-CFI 
and CBFA actively participate, to examine the technical implementing measures 
of Directive 2005/60/EC, (5) a discussion forum for financial intelligence units was 
created, the "Financial Intelligence Units platform". This forum discusses various 
aspects such as technical aspects for transposing the third directive, harmonizing 
of the approach of financial intelligence units, data protection and confidentiality, 
harmonization of databases, content of disclosures, disclosures of cash and cooper-
ation between FIUs at European level, (6) a secure computer network, called the 
FIU.NET, was set up to exchange information between Member State FIUs." [35] 
In the purpose to better understand the content of the directives, the description 
of the content of the Directive 2005/60/EC is proposed [29]. It's important to notice 
that these directives are based on the FATF recommendations recognized as an 
international standard and have to be applied in all member states. 
The Directive 2005/60/EC describes in its first chapter the money laundering 
(art.l), who is concerned by this directive (art.2) and proposes some definitions of 
the used terms ( credit institutions, financial institutions, property, criminal activity, 
serious crimes, beneficial owner, trust and company service providers, politically ex-
posed persans, business relationship and shell banks (art.3). The chapter 2 concerns 
customer due diligence. This chapter describes in which cases states have to take 
measures in this field (art.7), what measures have to comprise (art.8) which are the 
obligations of states in this field (art. 9-10), which institutions haven't the obligation 
to apply this customer due diligence (art.11), etc. The chapter 3 describes the re-
porting obligations of states. The chapter 4 concerns the information and statistical 
data that states have to perform and record. In the chapter 5, the enforcement mea-
sures are described. These measures concerns as well Internal procedures, training 
and feedback, as supervision, cooperation or penalties [29]. 
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3.1.4 The Council of Europe 
·"The Council of Europe adopted the Strasbourg Convention of 8 November 1990 on 
laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
Within the framework of the Council of Europe the evaluation program on anti-
money laundering measures (PC-R-EV, a select committee of experts in charge of 
evaluating measures on fighting money laundering and recently renamed Moneyval) 
started in 1997. Moneyval is a FATF-style regional body that analyses the compli-
ance with the FATF-Recommendations by its 25 member states (members of the 
Council of Europe with the exception of the FATF member states). 
In 2008 the convention of 1990 was broadened to include terrorist financing given 
that financing can not only take place through money laundering but also through 
legal activities. The Council of Europe provides technical assistance to its member 
states in order to strengthen their ability to address money laundering risks." [35] 
3.1.5 The UN 
"The Vienna Convention of 20 December 1988 against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was the first contribution of the United Nations 
(UN) to the fight against money laundering. It incriminated the laundering of the 
proceeds from drug trafficking. 
In 1997 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) adopted the 
Global Program against Money Laundering (GPML) in view of stimulating the legal, 
administrative and judicial implementation of anti-money laundering mechanisms. 
It also created the United Nations Offshore Forum that urges the countries and 
territories concerned to observe the international criteria on financial regulation and 
money laundering when they provide international financial services. 
On 14 December 2000 the UN adopted the Convention on Transnational Orga-
nized Crime that incriminates money laundering and contains measures on prevent-
. ing use of certain sectors for money laundering purposes. 
The United Nations is also involved in combating terrorism and terrorist financ-
ing. Since its creation multilateral disarmament and arms limitation are the main 
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goals in efforts to maintain peace and international security. The organization's main 
goals are to reduce and then eliminate nuclear weapons, destroy chemical weapons 
and strengthen bans on biological weapons. 
Using resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
aims at strengthening the capacity of Member States of the United Nations to 
prevent any terrorist acts on their territory or beyond [35, 42]" 
3.1.6 IMF and World Bank 
"Since 2001, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) 
have increased their involvement in the efforts against money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism, including strengthening their cooperation with the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). 
In 2002 the IMF, WB and FATF jointly undertook the drafting of a comprehen-
sive methodology paper in view of evaluating all countries worldwide against the 
international standards on preventing money laundering. 
The IMF and WB also created a coordination mechanism for providing technical 
assistance to countries in view of strengthening their economic, financial and legal 
framework in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing" [35]. 
It's important to notice that actions of this group is destined to governments 
and top banks and not to little financial institutions or individuals [28]. 
3.1. 7 The OCDE 
"The Organization for Economie Co-operation and Development (OECD) is based 
in Paris and has 34 members. Its mission is to promote policies that will improve 
the economic and social well-being of people around the world. 
The OECD has several activities including: 
- measuring productivity and global flows of trade and investment; 
- predicting future trends; 
- setting international standards on a wide range of topics, ranging from agricul-
ture and tax to the safety of chemicals; 
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- organizing forums on various themes. 
The fight against terrorism, tax dodgers, crooked businessmen and others whose 
actions undermine a fair and open society are amongst the themes discussed. 
In 2011 the OECD organized a first forum on "Tax and Crime - A whole of 
Government approach to fighting financial crime" in Oslo, Norway." [35]. 
3.1.8 In Sum 
In sum, at the trans-national level of the formal AML system, seven entities are 
present; the FATF, the Egmont group, the European union, the council of Europe, 
the UN, the IMF and World Bank, and the OECD. 
The FATF recommendations recognized as the international standards for the 
AML and the financing of terrorism, are used by some other entities to provide 
forum, guidelines of cooperation, coordination mechanism, programs to stimulate 
the AML, evaluation program, etc., but also to provide resolution and directive 
which have formal authority. 
The actions of these trans-national entities are principally destined to govern-
ments and some to top banks. In this level no measures are provided for smaller 
financial institutions and individuals. 
3.2 The National Level 
At the national level, international recommendations and directives which have for-
mal authority are interpreted according to each respective national priorities. There-
fore, all countries applying the same trans-national recommendations have their own 
AML organizational systems and different national laws are implemented in each 
country based on their recommendations interpretation. The success of the imple-
mentation of these recommendations depends on the strictness and the means of 
this interpretation [5, 22]. 
To illustrate this section, I propose to present the Belgian preventive anti-money 
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laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) system. 
In Belgium, the National Bank of Belgium is today "responsible for the individual 
prudential supervision of the majority of financial institutions (micro-prudential 
supervision)" [34]. Each Belgian institutions involved in the AML process (see 
section 3.3) have to report their suspicions to the Belgian Financial Intelligence 
Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI). "The Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit 
(CTIF-CFI), established by the Law of 11 January 1993, is a central part of the 
Belgian AML/CFT system. 
CTIF-CFI is an independent administrative authority with legal personality and 
is supervised by the Ministers of Justice and Finance. It is led by a magistrate Mr. 
Jean-Claude DELEPIERE and composed of legal and financial experts and a senior 
officer seconded from the federal police. Its composition, organization, operation 
and independence are stipulated in the Royal Decree of 11 June 1993. CTIF-CFI is 
in charge of processing suspicious financial facts and transactions linked to money 
laundering and terrorism financing and are reported by institutions and individuals 
specified in the law" [35]. 
"The Law of 11 January 1993 applies Directive 2005/60/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well 
as Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing 
measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
as regards the definition of politically exposed persan and the technical criteria 
for simplified customer due diligence procedures and for exemption on grounds of 
a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis. This law 
supplements the repressive approach to money laundering ( Article 505 of the Penal 
Code) with a series of preventive measures carrying administrative sanctions and 
imposing on the specified institutions and individuals a duty to cooperate to detect 
suspicious transactions and facts and report them to an authority created for this 
purpose, the Financiàl Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI)". 
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This law [1] describes who are the targets of this law (who has an obligations to 
report suspicious cases) ( art. 1 to 6), in which cases these institutions and individ-
uals have to identify their clients of the beneficiaries of their clients (art. 7 to 11), 
which are the actions that financial institutions and individuals described at the 
articles 1-6 have to perform and in which cases (art. 13 to 19), describes in which 
cases the payment in cash is limited (art.20 and 21), expresses in which cases and 
when institutions have the obligations to report suspicions to and collaborate with 
the CTIF-CFI, the obligations of the members of the CTIF-CFI, and other entities 
implicated in the transmission of information concerning money laundering of fi-
nancial terrorism (art. 22 to 39) and finally sanctions if institutions and individuals 
concerned by the art. 1 to 6 don't respect their obligations. 
3.2.1 Conclusion of the International and National Level 
All states having "diverse legal, administrative and operational frameworks and 
different financial systems, and so cannot all take identical measures to counter 
ML" [11]. Even if the FATF recommendations "set an international standard, 
which countries should implement through measures adapted to their particular 
circumstances" [11], and even if these recommendations are recognized as the inter-
national standard in this field, they have not a real formal authority. Consequently, 
even if countries have endorsed these recommendations they stay free to establish 
their law and to interpret these recommendations how they want, with the strict-
ness they want and according their interests and priorities. To help a most efficient 
as possible interpretation of international recommendations and directives at the 
national level some suggestions, guidelines, technical assistance, forum, etc. are 
established by trans-national entities (section 3.1). 
3.3 The Local Level 
The local level corresponds to all institutions and individuals involved in the AML 
process. To illustrate, as described by the article 2 and 3 of the Belgian Law of 11 
J anuary 1993 [1] cited in [35], the reporting obligation is applied to the following 
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financial institutions and individuals: the National Bank of Belgium, the Public 
Trustee Office, the Postal Service for its financial postal services, credit institutions 
governed by Belgian law, clearing institutions, payment institutions, intermediaries 
in banking and investment services, insurance companies situated in Belgium and 
authorized to deal in life insurance, insurance intermediaries, companies governed 
by Belgian law whose activities consist in giving investment advice or carrying out 
investment activities, the branches in Belgium of investment firms, collective in-
vestment undertakings governed by Belgian law, management companies of collec-
tive investment undertakings governed by Belgian law, the branches in Belgium of 
management companies of collective investment undertakings, persans situated in 
Belgium who professionally engage in transactions, mortgage companies situated in 
Belgium, market operators organizing the Belgian regulated markets, the natural or 
legal persons, the natural or legal persons that issue or manage credit cards, lease-
financing companies, security companies that provide services of surveillance and 
protection for transporting valuables, dealers in diamonds. Moreover, this report~ 
ing obligation also implied professions as notaries, bailiffs, natural or legal persons 
that carry out activities in Belgium and are registered in the capacity of company 
auditor in the public register of the Institute of Company Auditors (Institut des 
rviseurs d'entreprises/Instituut van de Bedrijfsrevisoren), natural or legal persons 
entered in the register of external accountants and in the register of external tax 
advisors, natural or legal persans registered on the roll of approved accountants and 
on the roll of approved tax specialist-accountants, lawyers when they assist their 
client in the planning or execution of transactions concerning the buying and selling 
of real property or business entities; management of his money, securities or other 
assets, opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts, organization 
of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies, 
creation, operation or management of companies, trusts, fiduciaries or similar legal 
arrangements, or when they act on behalf of and for their client in any financial or 
real property transaction. 
All these institutions and individuals, referred in this work as "financial insti-
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tutions" have a role in the ML detection. They are responsible for the detection 
and reporting of suspicious activities ( as defined by the national level) [5]. These 
regulated institutions have to translate national laws and directives fighting against 
money laundering in detection procedures. They are also responsible to keep eus-
tomer record, report large-value and suspicious activity reports and to coordinate 
with supervision centers to combat ML [22]. 
The ML detection process performed by financial institutions may be different 
according to the nature of the activities of the institutions and the country where it 
is established. For example, in Europe, as explained in subsection 3.1.3, the FATF 
recommendations are used by the European Union to establish directives imposing 
to all member states to establish laws to fight against ML. Each state publishes laws 
(e.g. the law of 11 January 1993 in Belgium described in section 3.2) requiring all 
financial institutions and individuals targeted by the European directives to imple-
ment measures according some cases and to report suspicions. The implementation 
of such measures, procedures is left to the responsibility of the institutions. 
Consequently, sophisticated technical AML solutions are more or less used by 
financial institutions according the nature of their activities, their motivation, their 
attitude towards money laundering, etc.(see chapter 4). For example, the detection 
process in an institution which is principally implicated in the private banking will 
be different than the detection performed in a bank more active in the retail banking 
[26]. Let us discuss both of them. 
The private banking is a service reserved to the richest customers. An institu-
tion which performs this activity knows well its customers and establishes a pro-
file/ scenario for each of its customers at the opening of each account. Through this 
profile customer information, profession, hobbies, habits, etc. are recorded. More-
over, the number of customer is limited and the amount on each account can be 
really high. For this kind of institutions, the ML detection in principally manually 
performed by AML experts. They compare a transaction which could be suspect 
to the initial profile established for each customer at the opening of each account. · 
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If the potentially suspect transaction is not conform to this profile, therefore the 
transaction is considered as suspect and reported. The role of AML software's is 
only to help human expert to easily detect potentially suspect transactions in fil-
tering some transactions according to the risky countries of people list for example. 
Highly sophisticated software's are not really useful due to the major place taken by 
the human analysis. The amount of money of a transaction is not a major indicator 
for such activity because it's a habit to see transactions with high amounts. 
In the case of retail banking which is not a privileged service and which is ac-
cessible by everyone who wants to have an account into a bank, the AML process 
is different. The institutions don't know all their customers because the number is 
too large and no profiling is performed at the opening of the account. Only, a gen-
eral profiling for customers of the same kind is established. Moreover; the amount 
on accounts and the amount of transactions are lower than in the private banking. 
Therefore, the ML detection is different. This one is less case by case according a 
particular profile but performed by the software according to a general profile. The 
amount of transactions is more taken into account than in the private banking be-
cause a transaction of a high amount is not a habit. Therefore, in those institutions 
AML software's take a major place in view of the large amount of data and the 
quality and the level of sophistication of those systems is important [26]. 
In sum, the ML detection at the local level involves the translation of laws into 
procedures and measures in each institution and the reporting of suspect transaction 
to supervision centers. These procedures and measures are different among institu-
tions according the nature of their activities. The success of the ML detection is 
linked to the strictness of the translation of laws into the institutions which is directly 
linked to the motivation to efficiently detect and report suspicious transactions, the 
attitude of the institutions towards anti-money laundering and the investment in 
this track ( see section 4). 
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3.4 Conclusion of the Formai Part 
To conclude this chapter, from the above we can easily understand that the formal 
AML system includes many actors at different levels. 
As described by the section 3.1, the trans-national level involves seven entities 
invested in the money laundering and financing of terrorism problems. These entities 
are the FATF, the Egmont group, the European Union, the council of Europe, the 
UN, the IMF World Bank and the OECD. 
These entities provide forum, guidelines of cooperation, coordination mechanism, 
programs to stimulate the AML, evaluation program, etc., but also resolutions and 
directives which have formal authority. These actions, which are mostly destined to 
government and top banks, are based on the FATF recommendations recognized as 
the international standards for the AML and the financing of terrorism. 
At the national level, directives and resolutions with formal authorities taken by 
international entities based on the FATF recommendations are interpreted accord-
ing countries'priorities, financial system, legal structure, etc .. Help is provided by 
international entities which provide forum, guidelines, motivate collaboration, etc, 
but this interpretation stay under the responsibility of each country and only the 
final result at the local level is evaluated. 
At the local level, AML national laws have to be translated into procedures and 
measures according to the nature of the activities of institutions. These procedures 
and measures are applied in financial institutions to detect money laundering as best 
as possible. To perform this detection, sophisticated AML software's can be more 
or less useful according to the nature of the activities of institutions. Indeed for 
some kind of activity ( e.g. the private banking), the human analysis take a bigger 
place than technical AML solutions. In the opposite, for other activities ( e.g. the re-
tail banking) sophisticated AML solutions take the major place in the ML detection. 
CHAPTER 3. THE FORMAL AML SYSTEM 52 
Therefore, at the formal level, the success of the detection of suspicious activi-
ties firstly depends on the interpretation and the implementation of trans-national 
recommendations into laws at the national level. In this level, a lack of performance 
in the ML detection could be explained by a bad interpretation of recommenda-
tions into national laws. This could reside in the fact that some countries don't 
use guidelines, forum, help, etc. proposed by the international entities (see section 
3.1). Moreover this interpretation is linked to national priorities, financial and legal 
structure of each country. Perhaps that the detection of money laundering is no the 
first priority for all countries and that all countries are not motivated in a same level 
by a strict and efficient interpretation of international recommendations. 
Lastly, the success also depends on the translation of these national laws into 
procedures and measures into financial institutions, at the local level. The success 
of the ML detection in this level is linked to the strictness of this translation and 
to the motivation to efficiently detect and report suspicious transactions. Whatever 
the taken measures and used tools, the success of the ML detection highly depends 
on the motivation, and implication of the institutions, this will be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 
The Informai AML System 
4.1 The analysis 
As explained in chapter 3, the gap between institutions which are efficient in the 
ML detection and those ones which are less is linked to the right translation of 
national laws into procedures and measures and their good applications by financial 
institutions. 
This chapter analyses the main factors influencing the performance of the trans-
lation of law into local procedures and therefore also influencing the ML detection 
performed by financial institutions. To this purpose, the third and less embedded 
system of the AML information system presented by the. TFI model (section 1.3) -
the informal AML system - is then presented. This system consists in the attitude, 
culture, beliefs, motivation and implication towards the ML problem. 
This chapter is based on two surveys, one [5] among 30 London banks and 
another [22] among Chinese financial institutions, and on two interviews: one [26] 
of a Belgian compliance officer in a private Belgian bank and the other [28] of a 
AML specialist who has worked in the AML sector in different countries and which 
supervises the ACAMS, Association of Certified Anti Money Laundering Specialists. 
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4.1.1 Two Surveys 
Xuan and Pengzhu [5] relate a survey of 30 London banks performing interviews of 
ML reporting oflicers (responsible for ML detection in financial institutions). This 
survey examines the attitude toward ML controls, the beliefs about the efliciency of 
ML regulations and about the performance of technical ML solutions. 
It reveals that "27 percent had a positive attitude towards ML controls, 40 per-
cent were neutral and 33 percent had a negative attitude. In addition, 60 percent 
believed that ML regulations were ineffective in reducing ML, and it was felt that 
the costs largely exceeded any benefits. Larger banks tended to have more positive 
attitude towards ML monitoring than median and smaller ones, and than wholesale 
banks in general. [ ... ] Where the Money Laundering reporting Oflicer is an senior 
manager, with direct access to the management board, it is easier to obtain resources 
and recommendations are likely to be acted upon more quickly" [5]. 
In another survey, Liu and Zhang [22] translate words from Chinese commercial 
banks and explain that "commercial banks sometimes regard AML as a kind of 
time-wasting and money-consuming job". They add that these commercial banks 
consider that "AML cannot bring direct profits but bring high costs" and that " 
AML in financial institutions can be viewed as a kind of risk management; Fail-
ure to report Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) will enhance the compliance risk, 
sometimes influence the bank's reputation and finally transferred to be a commercial 
risk". Sorne managers consider that AML management could "drive customers away 
from banks because customers always search for financial service with simple proce-
dure, high quality guarantee of business secret ... complex investigation required by 
AML governing agencies scares customers away ... " 
These words are approved through the survey of London banks [5] where they 
find the same opinions among managers. They reveal that "some banks adjust mod-
els' parameters in order to reduce the number of alerts that they need to investigate". 
They add that "senior managers and staff see AML as a regulatory requirement and 
an administrative burden focused on avoiding sanctions". Moreover they point out 
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the "risk of damage to the banks' reputation". 
4.1.2 Two Interviews 
An interview of a compliance officer in a Belgian private bank [26] completes the 
view proposed in the two presented surveys with additional information particular to 
the private Belgium banking context. According to this person, in this institution, 
the person at the head of the compliance department is legally responsible of the ML 
detection. If a ML transaction is not detected the compliance officer can be pursued 
for complicity. Moreover a lack in the ML detection can conduct to a reputation 
risk for the institution. This legal responsibility and reputation risk increase the 
motivation of the ML department to perform the detection as well as possible. 
This person adds that in this private bank, the detection is principally manually 
performed. It is based on a personal profile established for each customer at the 
opening of each account. The goal of this detection is principally the detection of 
the origin of fonds. And it is preformed based on client justification and a check of 
this justification according to the initial customer established profile. The role of 
software in this detection is limited to the filtering of some transactions according 
some criteria but the major part of the analysis is performed by human experts. 
However, this officer plans to introduce a more sophisticated AML system not by 
conviction of its efficiency but more to show governement that sophisticated mea-
sures are taken to seriously fight against money laundering. Indeed, she thinks that 
this new solution cannot bring more that the already currently performed detection 
which is principally based on human analysis. Moreover, sophisticated AML sys-
tems are considered by this officer as a waste of time because they have to introduce 
manually all the rules they use in the system. Lastly, which finally provides too 
much false positive detected cases and a waste of time. 
Another interview of a certified AML specialist [28], reveals that the most im-
portant lack of efficiency resides in the AML staff in financial institutions. Indeed, 
according this specialist, the majority of currently proposed AML solutions are ef-
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ficient. The lack of efficiency is in the use of these tools. 
The specialist assesses that most of compliance officers and AML staff don't 
know the ML process and the AML world. Moreover, these people are not always 
specialists in banking system but can be lawyers, etc. and therefore don't under-
stand in details the complexity of the banking process. Consequently, confronted to 
technical AML systems they don't know what they are looking for, what they want 
from the system, they have difficulties to integrate efficient rules in the system which 
can conduct to an efficient detection. Moreover, most of financial institutions don't 
want to invest time in well understanding the software, its parameters, its options,. 
etc. and therefore don't efficiently use it. In addition, they don't want to invest 
time in AML conferences, AML training, etc. to increase their knowledge in the ML 
process and in the detection. They buy a system to respect the law but don't use 
it with efficiency and are not invested in the ML track. 
According this specialist, these problems are directly linked to the motivation 
and the moral responsibility in the ML track. Indeed, financial institutions have 
the choice between implementing measures which are sufficient to respect laws and 
implementing measures to really stop the money laundering and to be active in this 
track. 
4.2 Conclusion 
Through these interviews and surveys, several issues of the ML detection from the 
informal level can be highlighted. 
As already explained in previous chapter, the ML detection performed by fi-
nancial institutions depends on the nature of their activities, their motivation and 
implication in the ML track. Consequently, the level of efficiency of the AML de-
tection can differ among institutions. 
This gab can be linked to different factors. They are presented below through 
three levels: the level of the organization itself, the senior management level, and 
the level of the AML staff/employees. At the level of the organization, the nature 
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and the attitude of organizations towards ML and the communication among them 
directly influence the efficiency of the detection. Secondly, the attitude of the senior 
manager is also linked to the implication and motivation in the ML track. And 
thirdly, the employee incapability and training inefficiency are also implied in the 
detection inefficiency. 
4.2.1 The Organization 
A) The Culture of the Organization 
The culture of the organization has a real impact in the implication and the moti-
vation for a ML track. Sorne companies speak about a "corporate social responsi-
bility", a "moral responsibility towards the customer", "an ethical responsibility", 
etc. [5, 26]. The implication and the motivation for the ML track is highly linked to 
this ethic and moral responsibility which surpass the simple commercial and com-
petitive goal that an institution can find in the AML track (see subsection 4.2.2). 
The place that certain compliance officers allocate to the human analysis in the 
ML detection can influence the investment in costly and highly sophisticated AML 
software's. Indeed, for some compliance officer, the human expertise has the major 
place in the money laundering detection and the use of highly sophisticated AML 
software's is more considered as a waste of time [26]. 
B) The Attitude towards ML 
The motivation for the implementation of a decision support system which efficiently 
tracks money laundering depends on the attitude towards money laundering [5]. 
Indeed, some commercial banks can see the track of money laundering as "a time-
wasting and money-consuming job" [22]. Moreover, some consider the management 
of money laundering as having a negative impact on the relationship with customers 
and as a risk to lose those ones and therefore important business. A risk linked to 
the reputation is also highlighted; according to some managers "failure report SARs 
will enhance the compliance risk and influence the reputation". 
The literature links this attitude with the size of institutions. Indeed, some 
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survey reveals that the attitude toward money laundering management is more 
positive for larger banks than smaller. A reason could be the larger amount of 
transactions of these banks which implied a higher risk on the world economy and 
for the institution itself. 
C) The Lack of Communication between Institutions 
Once an organization is implicated in the ML fight and has motivation enough to 
conduct this task as well as possible, other problems decreasing the efficiency of the 
detection can appear. A problem can corne from the lack of communication between 
different institutions which not exchange information easily for strategic, legal and 
operational reasons. "Without appropriate sharing of information, it is extremely 
difficult to verify the effectiveness of the ML modeling exercise." It is also difficult to 
know which ones of those available systems are more efficient than others in the ML 
detection and therefore improving developped solutions [5]. Concerning the inter-
institutions communication, it's important to take into account the data secrecy. 
Indeed each bank can only access to the data of its own customers and only to the 
account number, sometimes the name of a customer of another bank. Therefore, 
this communication and information sharing know important legal limitations [26]. 
4.2.2 The Senior Management 
The attitude of the senior manager is also directly interrelated with the adoption of 
a more or less efficient and sophisticated AML solution. When the senior manager 
supports AML and is convinced by the efficiency and the usefulness of an AML 
solution for the organization, more budget will be available to implement a more 
efficient and more sophisticated, therefore more costly, ML detection software [5]. 
It's important to understand that the implication of senior management in the 
fight against money laundering is highly influenced by media attention. Indeed 
media can bring more or less attention on the implication of institutions in the fight 
against money laundering. This attention can create a real positive 'commercial 
return for those institutions. One reason why some senior managers are motivated 
by the implementation of a highly sophisticated and efficient solution could be to 
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send the message that the organization takes seriously into account the ML problem. 
Therefore, in this case, tracking suspicious activities has more things in common with 
a commercial and competitive goal than a real ethic implication. 
Moreover if the AML responsible is a persan who has access to the board, there 
will be more AML actions and implication from the organization[5]. 
4.2.3 The Employees - Capabilities and 'Training 
Another reason for the lack of effi.ciency of the ML detection could be "the employee 
incapability and training inefficiency" [22] of some organizations. AML staffs are 
often not aware about the responsibility and the risk liked to money laundering 
management. They view AML as "a method to guard the finance order in their 
country" and therefore are not really implicated in this track and don't invest time 
to learn more, to follow conferences, to learn the system they use to improve its 
performance, etc.. Moreover compliance offi.cers are not always specialists in the 
banking process and in AML. Therefore, they don't understand the ML process 
using the banking system. Consequently, they are not able to implement efficient 
rules in system which decrease AML solutions' performance. 
Moreover, the survey [22] highlights that AML staff is instable. Indeed they 
follow training and one year later they are transferred in another department and 
other employees are trained. This instability obstructs a high AML expertise and 
experience by AML staff. 
It also appears that trainings proposed by AML solutions providers only explain 
the system in general and are not really detailed and focused on the improvement 
of the ML detection. Moreover, they do not evolve with the evolution of the ML 
system and the content of these trainings is continuously the same one and not 




As presented in section 1.3, the money laundering information system is composed 
of three independent and interrelated subsystems: the technical, the formal and 
the informal system. Current research about money laundering is mostly based 
on one of these three system: the technical articles presenting systems don't care 
about the legislation around money laundering, nor about the technical capabilities 
of AML staff in financial institutions, the legislation don't care about methods used 
by financial institutions to respect it, etc. This thesis aims to explain the reasons 
for the lack of effi.ciency in the ML detection performed by financial institutions in 
analysing the three systems. Thanks to this inter-domain analysis, a more complete 
and realistic view of the reasons for the lack of efficiency of the ML detection is 
provided. 
Chapter 2 describes the technical system, highlights limits of currently imple-
mented AML systems and proposes some techniques which could overcome these 
limits. The formal level is studied by chapter 3 and highlights issues for the ML 
detection at three levels: the trans-national, national and local level. Finally, chap-
ter 4 explores the informal level and develops issues linked to the AML staff which 
decrease the efficiency of the ML detection in certain institutions. 
The current chapter is divided in three sections: the technical level, the formal 
level and the informal level. For each section, firstly a summary is proposed and 
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next, recommendations for a better performance are exposed. 
It's important to understand that due to the difficulties met to access imple-
mented systems, the technical recommendations are conceptual and based on my 
intuition after the investigation of some articles of the literature about AML sys-
tems. Consequently a more deep and concrete investigation and meetings with 
solution users and providers could bring more detlailed and less intuitive recom-
mendations at the technical level. Concerning recommendations at the formal and 
informal level, these ones are also based on gathered information and more inter-
views are also needed to provide more concrete and complete recommendations (see 
section 6.2). 
5.1 The Technical Level 
5.1.1 The Current Situation 
For institutions with a large amount of customers and transactions, the use of AML 
technical systems takes a major place in the ML detection. Moreover, as presented 
in the TFI framework (section 1.3), this system is the most embedded in the global 
AML information system. This central position highlights the importance of this 
technical system but also the fact that this one is directly influenced by the two 
other systems: the formal and informal ones. 
Section 2.2 presents limits of techniques involved in currently implemented AML 
software's highlighted by interviewed AML experts. This investigation has resulted, 
in section 2.2.2, in required qualities for a more suitable and efficient AML system. 
These requirements are the following ones: (1) adding a learning capability to AML 
system, (2) adding mechanisms which can bring an more accurate detection, and 
(3) the need to have a system which canuse different database format. 
For each of these expected qualities, some solutions are presented in section 2.3. 
Knowledge repositories and neural network can be used to bring learning capa-
bilities to data mining - based solutions. The results of previous detection are stored 
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in knowledge repositories which are used to link a degree of suspicious for some kind 
of transactions. This calculation is used by a neural network to establish a ranking 
of detected transactions. 
Intelligent agents can also be used in AML solutions for the investigation. By 
their own properties, intelligent agents bring learnability by memorizing their an-
terior experience. Moreover, in collaboration with other agents, they can share 
knowledge they don't have in isolation. 
In the purpose to provide a more accurate detection with less false positive and 
negative suspicious cases, some mechanisms can be used to improve the classifica-
tion: (1) the use of learning capability bringing additional knowledge which can 
provide an accurate future detection, (2) the use of a local outlier factor algorithm 
which can rank abnormal transactions according their distance to the category of 
point with a normal behavior, (3) the use of account history and transactions infor-
mation to see transactions as a temporal sequence and not more in isolation, ( 4) the 
use of visualization tools supporting the classification based on predefined keywords 
in highlighting relationships between keywords, between keywords and account, and 
can discover accounts with similar characteristics in the purpose to discover other 
suspicious accounts, and (5) the use of algorithms which calculate the degree of 
suspicion of a persan and the degree of association between two entities to identify 
criminal networks. 
Finally, implementing a three-tiers architecture can allow to respond to the prob-
lem of systems which require a specific database format in proposing an interface 
between datasets of financial institutions and the used AML software. 
5.1.2 Recommendations 
As summarized above, a more efficient AML solution would perform a classification 
with a minimum of errors based on predefined rules and on the results of previous 
detections. 
Two kinds of solution are able to perform this detection: data mining-based 
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solutions, and intelligent agents-based solutions. 
A) A Data-mining-based Solution 
Data-mining methods are particularly suitable for the ML detection. Indeed some 
methods are descriptive and allow for example the classification, the identification 
of trends and correlations, the profiling of some customers, etc., while others are 
predictive and allow to predict new trends, patterns, etc. based on previous detec-
tions. 
In the purpose to provide an accurate classification provided by DM tools as 
clustering it's more than required to add a learning capability. In this purpose, the 
storage of additional knowledge from previous detection in a knowledge repository 
can be a suitable solution. Techniques as neural networks can bring an accurate 
classification through a ranking of detected transactions based on previous detected 
ones stored in the repositories. 
It's important to understand that this learning capability could be really useful 
in long term because as explained by a Belgian compliance officer [26], the amount 
of suspicious cases which are really detected and considered as suspect is so low 
( three last year for this officer) and have so little points in common that a learning 
will bring not really additional knowledge and will be not really useful for future 
detections in short term. Moreover an artificial/supervised learning is not really 
possible in the ML context due to the unpredictable aspect. 
But it should be interesting if all detection cases from all banks of all countries 
could be put together to provide interesting additional knowledge useful in more 
short term. 
Sorne additional tools evocated in section 2.3 also allows to increase the precision 
of the detection. These possibilities are the use of a local outlier factor algorithm, the 
use of a sequence matching, the use of visualization tools, and the use of algorithms 
which calculate the degree of suspicion of a person and the degree of association 
between two entities. 
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B) An Intelligent Agents-based Solution 
A solution used intelligent agents is developed in section 2.3.1. 
As defined by the French Normalization Association, an intelligent agent (IA) is 
"an object using artificial intelligence techniques: it adapts his behavior to its en-
vironment and acts as a learning sub-system by memorizing its anterior experience. 
It enriches the system it uses by adding automatic functions treating, controlling, 
memorizing and transferring information." 
Properties of an IA are the following ones: an IA is autonomie, enable to commu-
nicate and cooperate, enable to reason and react to its environment and is mobile. 
It also includes one or more of the following elements: a predefined knowledge base, 
and an inference motor (which allows having complex reasoning). Moreover, it 
can also include a knowledge acquisition system and a learning mechanism [17]. A 
multi-agents system (MAS) is a group of agents which interact together in a specific 
environment to reach together their goals. They take other agents knowledge and 
capabilities to overcome their own limits [15]. 
At the section 2.3.1, these IAs are applied following Real-time Exception Manage-
ment Decision Model which is a suitable model which imitates the decision process 
that a human would follow to detect ML cases. It's important to have an accurate 
detection to fit human decision in the ML world as well as possible. Indeed accord-
ing to this model, the goal of each agent is defined. 
Intelligent agents fit also perfectly the complex AML environment which involves 
many entities [13]. Indeed, agents could be autonomously and collaboratively re-
sponsible for different activities. An interesting point in using IAs is the fact that 
each agent having its own work, if we want add functionalities to the model, it's 
possible to ad~ new agents and therefore redesign the model by simply adding new 
agents. Moreover, thanks to these properties, intelligent agents bring learning ca-
pabilities and adaptability which are completely suitable for the ML context. 
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C) Conclusion 
In sum, through our investigation we can highlight two technical options: (1) using 
data-mining tools with natural computing techniques and additional tools to provide 
an accurate detection or (2) using a multi agents system following a good making 
decision model. Note that these options are not excusive. 
These two options present advantages but also di:fficulties. The use of data-
mining tools requires a suitable parameter selection to be really performing. In 
contrary, once build intelligent agents are performing and not depend on a parameter 
selection. But to be performing together, IAs have to follow a performing making 
decision model defining the role of each agents. Moreover intelligent agents don't 
need additional tools to provide the required learning capability which is a real 
advantage for this option. Another points in favor of the use of intelligent agents 
is the fact that if we want add functionalities to the model, it's possible to add 
new agents with a new work in the model and by its properties, these agents will 
automatically work with other ones already implemented in the model. 
We can then notice that the use of intelligent agents for the ML detection can also 
be an option even if currently the most of proposed solutions are data-mining-based 
solution. 
5.2 The Formai Level 
5.2.1 The Current Situation 
The formal level, presented in the chapter 3, concerns as well international recom-
mendations and directives as the interpretation of those ones in laws at the nation 
level, but also the translation of laws into procedures and measures in the financial 
institutions. 
At the trans-national level, the FATF formulates recommendations on which are 
based directives which have formal authorities ( e.g. the directives of the European 
Union). Members of those entities have to interpret these directives and integrate it 
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in their laws at the national level. Other trans-national entities provide guidelines, 
suggestions, forum, technical assistance, evaluation, help, etc. to governments and 
top banks for a suitable interpretation of international directives in national laws. 
At the local level, AML national laws are translated into concrete procedures 
and measures to detect and report ML according to the nature of the activities of 
institutions. 
Therefore, at the formal level the success of the detection of suspicious activities 
depends first on the interpretation and the implementation of trans-national rec-
ommendations into laws at the national level and next to the right translation into 
procedures in each institution. 
5.2.2 Recommendations 
The lack of performance in the ML detection could reside in the fact that some 
countries don't use the help provided by international entities as forum, technical 
help, evaluation, etc. Moreover this interpretation is linked to national priorities 
of each country. Perhaps that the detection of money laundering is not the first 
priority for all countries. 
In the purpose to improve the performance of the detection some measures can 
be taken at the trans-national level. Indeed, currently only guidelines are proposed 
to countries for the interpretation of trans-national recommendations in national 
laws but countries stay free to interpret these ones in a more or less strict way. To 
avoid not strict enough interpretations, it should be useful to legally impose some 
guidelines or to control the national laws to be sure that they are strict enough. 
Next, the success also depends on the translation of national laws into procedures 
by financial institutions, at the local level. The strictness and rigor of this translation 
is directly linked to the level of motivation and implication in the ML track (see 
section 4. 
The detection of suspicious behaviors depending on the nature of the activities 
of financial institutions, some guidelines/standards having formal authority have to 
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be implemented according this nature ( e.g. for private banking, for retail banking, 
for lawyers, etc.). These guidelines with a formal authority as well for the inter-
pretation of trans-national recommendations as for the translation of national laws 
into procedures could set a certain level of strictness which can also be controlled 
by international entities with a risk for the reputation of the institution in the case 
of a negative evaluation. 
Another recommendation to motivate the rigor of the translation of national laws 
into procedures at the level of financial institutions should be, as already done in 
Belgium, to impute a legal responsibility to the persan at the head of the compliance 
department of each institution integrated in the AML process. This legal responsi-
bility can strongly motivate the entire AML track in financial institutions and can 
also increase the communication among compliance officers of different institutions 
about suspicious cases. 
5.3 The Informai Level 
5.3.1 The Current Situation 
The section 4 has described problems meet at the informal level which can have 
a negative impact on the ML detection. These issues have been classify in three 
groups: these ones related to the institution itself (its nature, its attitude towards 
the AML track and the lack of communication among institutions), those linked to 
the senior management in these institutions, and issues at the level of employees 
( their incapability and the training inefficiency). 
At the level of the organizations, the implication and the motivation for the 
ML track is highly linked to an ethic, a moral responsibility in the ML problem. 
Moreover, the place allocated to the human analysis can take in the ML detection 
can influence the investment in costly and highly sophisticated AML software's. 
The attitude of institutions towards money laundering is also directly linked to 
the motivation for the implementation of efficient measures to track money launder-
ing. Sorne institutions have a negative vision of the ML track and consider it as a 
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waste of time, as a risk for their reputation, a risk to lose important business, etc. 
Finally a lack of communication among institutions has also been highlighted as 
a limit for an efficient detection. 
At the level of the senior management, the attitude of the senior manager has 
an important impact in the implication of the institution in the ML detection. This 
motivation can corne from a moral responsibility or from a commercial ambition. 
Concerning the AML staff, some issues have also been highlighted:(1) the lack of 
knowledge in banking system and ML process of compliance officers and therefore 
an under-efficiently use of implemented technical solutions, (2) the lack of awareness 
and time investment concerning the ML process, the importance and impact of the 
detection and their responsibility in this process,(3) a training concerning the used 
AML system which is too general and not focused on the improvement of the ML 
detection according the nature of the institution and ( 4) the problem that in some 
institutions the AML staff changes too frequently. 
5.3.2 Recommendations 
In the purpose to increase the motivation for the ML track in institutions, a measure 
can be taken to increase the responsibility of person of the head of the compliance 
department. This person is as a cornerstone for the motivation and the implication 
of the AML staff in their job and is also responsible for the training, the AML 
awareness, etc. 
In Belgium this responsibility is forced by a legal responsibility imposed to the 
person at the head of the compliance department in financial institutions. Perhaps 
that if such measures were introduced in other countries, the global ML detection 
which is an international process could be improved. 
It's also important to have, as senior managers, people with an implication and 
a motivation for the AML track. An awareness person can allow more investment 
in this field, and can support the decision of the compliance officers. 
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Concerning the training and the awareness of the AML staff, several solutions 
are possible. First of all, to be efficient, it's necessary for institutions to have a ded-
icated AML staff which is not all the time transferred to another department. Next, 
the AML training and awareness could be enhanced by governments which could 
require that the AML staff follows certain AML conferences and workshops to bet-
ter understand the AML world and the ML process. Secondly, compliance officers 
which have no formation in finance or experience in the banking system should have 
the obligation to follow formations in this field to better understand the banking 
system. Moreover, the training concerning the implemented AML system proposed 
by providers would be more specific to the nature of financial institutions and to 
the improvement of the ML detection according this nature. 
Concerning the communication between institutions from a same country but 
also between different countries, it's important to understand that this commu-
nication is limited by the data protection imposed to the financial system. But 
establishing as in Belgium, an entity which is responsible to receive all suspicious 
cases from all institutions of a same country and which has access to all account 
information in the country can be useful to have a more global view and to be an 
intermediary for the communication among institutions. 
Chapter 6 
Methodology and Future Work 
6.1 About the Methodology 
This thesis is based as well on three interviews of experts in the field of money 
laundering as on the literature about money laundering at the financial, financial 
and governmental level. 
This section describes these two ways of research and highlights some diffi.culties 
met in these investigations. 
6.1.1 The Literature 
In the purpose to understand experts'assertions about the lack of effi.ciency of the 
ML detection performed by financial institutions, a part of this research is based on 
article of the literature. This investigation is perfomed as well at the technical level 
describing techniques and mechanisms to fight against money laundering, as at the 
formal level with the investigation of international recommendations and directives, 
national laws, etc., and also at the informal level with surveys performing interview 
in some financial institutions about the motivation and the implication of the AML 
staff. 
Concerning the technical literature a serious diffi.culty has been met. Each tech-
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nical article presenting a new framework, algorithm or technique to better detect 
suspicious activities is oriented by the interest of its authors. Indeed, these articles 
are written by experts in specific technical domains: data-mining, intelligent agents, 
statistics, etc. who want to follow the AML stream which presents an increasing 
interest. In this purpose, they try to stick their own experience of their domain 
to the ML detection. They highlight some current AML solutions limits that their 
technique can solve and often don't discuss other limits that their solution cannot 
solve. The expectations for a new AML solution which could be more suitable and 
efficient than previous one, are sometimes too oriented and limited to what the 
techniques presented by authors can propose and solve. Identifying AML current 
solution limits and techniques which could overcome those ones is really diffi.cult 
and requires a strong and long investigation. 
Moreover, proposed technical solutions often forget constraints and limits linked 
to the financial system. These limits are as well legal constraints like the data pro-
tection as practical constraints like the content of a transaction which is principally 
no text but only account numbers, sometimes a name and a communication. For 
example a proposed technique is the use of keywords for the investigation while 
almost no text is present in transactions. Another example is the proposition to im-
plement techniques highlighting relationships among accounts to identify criminal 
network. In theory this proposition will be useful but legally a financial institution 
only knows the details about accounts in its entity and only the number of account 
in other institutions. From the fact that the ML process implies many institutions, 
is almost impossible for an institution to identify relationship as family link, etc. 
6.1.2 Interviews 
This thesis involve three interviews, one of a detached expert at the internal affairs 
department at the European Commissïon, one of a persan at the head of the com-
pliance department in a Belgium Private Bank, and a third one of a persan at the 
head of a large group of EU compliance oflicers and member of the ACAMS, the 
Association of Certified Anti Money Laundering Specialists. 
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Through these three interviews, I could have a first concrete and practical view of 
the AML process and perceive the complexity of this international process involving 
many entities at many levels in many countries. 
I could also receive information which was really specific to the context of the 
interviewed persan. For example, the persan at the head of the compliance depart-
ment in the Belgian private bank could bring me information specific to the AML 
process in a private bank in Belgium. 
Consequently I could understand the importance to not only performing an in-
vestigation through the literature but also to increase the number of interviews. To 
have a total and concrete view of the AML process it is needed to interview as well 
all kinds of institutions and individuals targeted by the 2005/60/EC directives (see 
subsection 3.1.3 in different countries as members of the formal system (see section 
3 at the international and national level in different countries. 
This goal has been confronted to some difficulties linked to the sensitive aspect of 
the AML system. Indeed, it was really difficult to meet people in this field without 
knowing people who have contacts in this system. 
Therefore this thesis is limited to a conceptual aspect with some limited prac-
tice and concrete elements which bring already serious indications, elements and 
hypotheses concerning the lack of efficiency but which could be more substantive 
with more meetings. This lack of interviews and access to implemented systems con-
duct to propose recommendations which are conceptual, intuitive and not enought 
detailed. Consequently more interviews at the formal and informal level, a more 
deep and concrete investigation, and meetings with solution users and providers 
could bring more detailed and less intuitive recommendations at the technical level, 
formal and informal level(see section 6.2). 
6.2 Future work 
As explained in the section 6.1, the current thesis already proposes a first and 
detailed view of the AML process and of some of sources of its lack of efficiency but is 
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limited. The proposed recommendations are also limited to conceptual and intuitive 
propositions. These limits are first due to the available literature in the technical 
area which is biaised and too oriented in the technical expertise domain of authors. 
Secondly, the sensitive aspect of this field obstructs the access to really implemented 
systems and contact with experts. Therefore this work is principally based on the 
literature about money laundering sustaining some experts' assertations. 
My goal is to continue this work and to go beyond the presented limits of this 
thesis. 
If this thesis is limited to the literature review it's principally due to difficulties to 
have appointments. For the moment l've only meet three really interesting experts 
in the AML domain. These people bring me a first contact with the real ML track 
and I could realize how much it's important to meet experts and to join the real 
AML world. 
Therefore, I plan to continue this investigation and to meet other people from 
the AML system as well in Belgian institutions as in other countries. I plan to meet 
people from different areas: as well commercial, private, retail banks as international 
and national bank. I would like to have contact with those diverse domains of 
activities because the nature of those activities influences the methods taken to 
fight against money laundering in financial institutions. I would also meet the other 
institutions and individuals cited in the art.2 of the 2005/60/EC directive in different 
countries. 
The limitations of this thesis conduct me to currently propose a conceptual work 
based on an inter-domain analysis which brings already serious indications, elements 
and hypotheses concerning the lack of efficiency in the ML detection performed by 
financial institutions but which is too conceptual and too far from the real AML 
system which is really complex. This work requires now an immersion in the real 
AML system to be more realistic, practical and less conceptual. It's the reason why 
I hope to have the chance to continue this work through a PhD. 
My ambition is first the identification of the lack of efficiency through AML 
software's aiming to provide a better solution with new framework and more suitable 
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techniques. The current thesis identifies some limits through the literature and some 
techniques which can overcome these limits. But obviously it's only a conceptual 
and literature based analysis which has to be supported by a practical cases. 
In this purpose, I plan to meet some AML solutions providers, discussing with 
them which techniques they use and the reason of their choice. Through these 
meetings I firstly want to compare the performance of the different implemented 
techniques. Secondly, I would like to discuss with technical expert about possible 
other techniques which could improve the efficiency of their solution. 
Morover, many pieces of research are performed about the gap between business 
and IT in other domains. I could be interresting to indentify on which criteria they 
base their analysis. By this mean we could perform a similar investigation in the 
AML domains. 
Next, I would like to catch information at the formal and informal level and 
about their influences on these AML technical solutions. 
At the informal level, it appears that the efficiency of the ML detection depends 
on the implemented solution but not only. Indeed, two identical AML solutions 
implemented in two different institutions in a same country have not the same ef-
ficiency because the informal environment is different ( e.g. due to the implication 
of the AML staff, the awareness of the senior management, the moral responsibility 
and ethic instead of a simple commercial goal...). It appears also that this infor-
mal environment is directly linked to the training for the AML staff which is not 
practical enough: no example enough, no application, etc. Therefore I would like to 
take contacts as well in commercial and non-commercial banks, national and inter-
national ones as public or private institutions. The major goal of this investigation 
would be to discover if there are differences of efficiency linked to something other 
than technical solution and directly related to the nature of the institution (private, 
public, commercial, non-commercial, etc). I'll analyze the level of motivation and 
implication in the AML process according the nature of the firm. 
At the formal level, it appears that two identical solutions implemented in two 
different countries haven't the same efficiency. This is directly related to the inter-
pretation of the trans-national recommendations (FATF and EC directives) by each 
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nation according to their own priorities and the translation of national laws into 
local procedures according the nature of the activities of financial institution. Then 
I would like to analyze firstly what is different between countries interpretation and 
which interpretation provides the more efficient ML detection, and secondly I would 
like analyze the translation of laws into procedures performed by institutions. 
In the purpose to continue my investigation with a more concrete aspect and 
to provide a global view highlighting reasons for the lack of efficiency as well at 
the technical level as at the formal and informal ones, I've already take some con-
tact with the European commission which have arole at the formal trans-national 
level, With the ACAMS, "THE international membership organization dedicated to 
enhancing the knowledge and expertise of AML/CTF and financial crime detection 
and prevention professionals, from a wide range of industries, in both the public and 
private sectors" [40]. I've also contact with the National bank of Belgium (BNB) 
which has the responsibility of the AML control, and with the bank international du 
Luxembourg and the bank Degroof. I've also a contact with SAS and the responsi-
ble of the compliance department at SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication, "a member-owned cooperative through which the fi-
nancial world conducts its business operations with speed, certainty and confidence" 
[40]. 
I plan to perform semi-structured interviews. Indeed, as seen, the AML sprocess 
involves many entities with many actors in many countries. People implicated in 
this process can have very different profiles and during their carreer they can have 
meet more than one of the three systems composing the AML information system 
(technical, formal and informal). Moreover, these systems are independant but 
interrelated. Therefore, a persan linked to the AML process can bring information 
as well at the technical, formal or informal level because during his carreer this 
persan has been confronted to these three interrelated systems. 
I plan to keep in minci the structure in three levels ( technical, formal and in-
formal) and the limits for the ML detection efficiency about each of these levels 
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highlighted in this thesis like analytical grid for future interviews. 
The figure 6.1 illustrates an example of the grid that I plan to use. 
level problem subproblem 
technica! 
A lack of learning 
A specific data base format 
Co nfigu ration d ifficu lti es 
Too manydetection errors 
formai 
Lack of strictness in the 
interpretation of 
international directives 




Lack ofstrictness in the 
translation of national 






A lack of training 
A Back of capabilities 
A Back of awareness 
Figure 6.1: Example of analitical grid 
For example, if I meet someone more oriented at the technical level, firstly, I 
plan to recolt information which can confirm or refute the first limits of the AML 
technical systems highlighted in this thesis. Next, I plan to discuss about other 
limits they have met during their carreer at the technical level and the possible 
solutions that can solve these limits from their expertise keeping in mind solutions 
proposed in this thesis. But I also want to let them discuss about subjects around 
the technical system which can enrish my analysis at the formal and/or informal 
level. 
I plan to perfom in the same way for people more oriented in the formal or in 
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the informal level: keeping in mind the structure in three levels and the first results 
about each level. More interviews I have more my analytical grid can be enrished 
and more each interview can have reference points for the discussion. 
l'm persuaded that my formation in information management between the busi-
ness and the computer science could bring me a advantage to collaborate with people 
from the technical system and people from the formal and informal one. 
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